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Throughout history states have pursued both
cooperative and power-oriented strategies.

Moralists and

realists have long questioned the appropriateness of using
force to gain state objectives.

Recent analysts have

stressed that states have a moral duty to manage
international uncertainty in the best interests of their
citizens.

While this might involve utilizing both

power-seeking and order-seeking strategies, it has been
suggested that pursuing order-seeking strategies could help
alleviate international uncertainty.

2

An historical survey, as well as recent case studies
in Grenada and Nicaragua, indicate that the United States
often has relied upon military strategies in the Caribbean
Basin.

The United States has employed a variety of

techniques including "shows-of-force," threats, coercive
diplomacy, intervention, and covert activities.

These

policies appear to have been based upon the assumption that
military policies can be carefully calculated to alter the
behavior of another state.

Due to classified information,

sensitive information is often restricted regarding this
topic.

However, available information indicates that

American foreign policy regarding the use of force in the
Caribbean Basin has not been useful.
While such policies may appear to have been successful
in the short run, the same policies often have brought
negative repercussions in the long run.

Not only has the

United States been regarded unfavorably, but it has been
portrayed as a nation which only observes international law
when it is convenient to do so.

Further, international

uncertainty has often been exacerbated by U.S. actions.
Also, it is not clear that such military strategies always
have been carefully

designed~

and even if they were, such

policies would not be completely predictable.

The United

States needs to design new foreign policy strategies, relying
less upon military force.
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You must know there are two ways of contesting,
the one by the law, the other by force ••• because
the first is frequently not sufficient, it is
necessary to have recourse to the second.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
An international order cannot be based on power
alone for the simple reason that mankind will
in the long run always revolt against naked power.
An international order presupposes a substantial
measure of general consent.
E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis
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CHAPTER I
THE UTILITY OF FORCE
In spite of pronouncements regarding the necessity for
international law and order, the United States as well as
other nations have continued to rely upon force in the international arena.

Incidents in the 1980s, as in the Falklands,

Grenada, Lebanon, Libya, and Nicaragua reveal that violence
and the threat of violence have remained as state strategies
in international politics.

Such calculated plans have rep-

resented attempts "to influence the course of international
developments in a desired manner.• 1
However, the unpredictability of both the international environment and of the military strategies make
it imperative to reexamine the assumptions regarding the
necessity for force as well as the utility of present
military policies.

Questions--ranging from moral objections

to pragmatic considerations--have arisen regarding the appropriateness of using force to obtain state objectives.

An

overview of U.S. military strategies in the Caribbean Basin
with emphasis on the Nicaraguan situation reveals the
problems of the U.S. military policies, both from a pragmatic
and moral or philosophical point of view; furthermore, such a

2

study reveals the need to develop alternatives to military
strategies.
REEXAMINATION OF HISTORICAL ASSUMPTIONS
Need and Utility
There have been times the need and utility of military
force have been questioned.

During such periods states have

'
attempted to maintain
peaceful international relations with
each other.

For example, in 1814-1815, after the era of

Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna attempted to formulate
treaties that would create a roore stable order in Europe.
And, the Holy Alliance, by stressing the value of a ruler
acting as a Christian toward his subjects and other rulers,
also attempted to create a more positive international
environment.
However, in spite of efforts at cooperation, states
have often resorted to force to achieve their goals.

As

Machiavelli pointed out, if lawful behaviors do not achieve
desired goals, it may be necessary for the state to employ
force. 2
And E. H. Carr has emphasized that in the early
nineteenth century Karl Maria von Clausewitz, attempting to
advance Prussian interests, emphasized the legitimacy of
force by stating:

" ••• war is nothing but the continuation

of political relations by other means.•3

As character-

ized by Ziegler, Bismarck followed Clausewitz's dictum "that
war is a useful instrument of policy" and believed that:

3

" .•• it is not by speeches and resolutions that the great
questions of the time are decided ••• but by iron and
blood. 114

Bismarck's successful military experiences with

Prussia and the unification of Germany reinforced the idea
that war is a useful policy.

Prussian battle deaths were

low in comparison to the enemy; and the wars did not seem
disruptive to the economic and political structure in the
home country because the wars were so rapid. 5
Strategy of Force
Methods of force and concepts regarding its use have
also varied during historical periods.

While force has

undoubtedly been used at times as a threat, force often has
been associated with war, with brute force being used to
achieve specific goals.

States have used forceful methods

to acquire territory, to create or consolidate a political
order, to defeat an enemy, or to acquire position or wealth
in the international system--above all, force was used
because "states expected to benefit from its use and from the
new distributions they expected after it had been used." 6
Moralist and Realist Arguments
Viewpoints regarding the appropriateness of force have
been most of ten presented from a moralist or realist perspective.

Certain broad concepts have tended over time to

characterize these terms.
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Moralists have argued that forceful acts need to be
judged in accordance with higher religious or moral law. 7
Like individuals, states are expected to comply with this
higher standard.

Moralists believe that cooperation and

observance of international law will facilitate this
compliance and promote order and peace within the
international community.

Moralists recognize that states and

their rulers do not behave according to moral standards, but
they believe "they ought to do so" and that it is the duty
of leaders to create an international environment in which
The moralist position can be
they will achieve this aim. 8
further refined by differentiating between a moral, or
ethical perfectionist, and a non-perfectionist moralist.
According to Arnold Wolfers a moral perfectionist would
consider whether the end justifies the means and would
conclude that "no matter how noble and virtuous the end, it
never justifies the use of means that violate moral/ethical
standards." 9
However, a non-perfectionist moralist would
judge an act upon both the ethical standard of behavior and
upon the specific context within which the act is
performed.lo

Therefore, a non-perfectionist moralist

would agree "in condoning the acts of those who kill in
self-defense." 11
Rather than asking whether policies are in accord with
abstract moral principles, realists would evaluate a policy
by its political consequences. 12
In particular, realists
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would consider how a policy would affect the power of the
nation.

Realists stress that no state recognizes an

authority higher than itself, and there is no international
agency capable of maintaining order.

This results in an

anarchic international environment which is characterized by
insecure state relationships.

It has been argued that states

not only fear losing their national sovereignty and
territorial boundaries in such an environment, but that
states of ten deliberately seek to increase their power in
such a situation.

In such an anarchic environment, it has

been suggested by moralists that states need to make policies
which will protect their national sovereignty and territory.
However, realists have not considered states to be bound by
the same moral principles as individuals.

In fact, according

to Morgenthau • ••• the state has no right to let its moral
disapprobation ••• get in the way of successful political
action.•13

E.H. Carr has agreed:

•In the international

order, the role of power is greater and that of morality
less.• 14 To these realists the criterion to be applied in
choosing methods is not their morality but rather their
effeciency. 15
However, some realists still feel obliged
to respect the moral standards of others, for they realize
that to be completely ruthless can create strong opposition
and set back their cause.16

6

REEXAMINATION OF RECENT ASSUMPTIONS
Need and Utility Reconsidered
As in other historical periods, states in the twentieth
century have sought to emphasize cooperation in the
international environment.

The League of Nations, the United

Nations, the emphasis on international law, and the continued
theorizing concerning possible philosophical/moral approaches
to foreign policy all testify to the search for more peaceful
approaches to international relations.
Yet, in the twentieth century the threat or use of
violence has circumscribed international politics.

It can be

argued that international law actually legitimizes military
force by such concepts as sovereignty, self-help, selfdefense or retaliation.

The World Wars, Korean and Vietnam

wars are not only examples of violence, but unlike Bismarck's
Prussian victories, they have proven to be disruptive,
lengthy, and costly. 17
The threat of nuclear destruction
has also affected attitudes regarding the usefulness of
force.

While it can be argued that it would be possible to

survive (or even •win") a nuclear war, the dangers of using
nuclear weapons also has been emphasized.

The employment of

advanced military capabilities has come to be regarded as
self-destructive1 the fear exists that even limited violence
could escalate.
continue.

Still, threats and military confrontations

7

In the 1980s the world has experienced a remilitarization of international relations, with an emphasis on the use
of limited physical coercion as a means of achieving
l8
.
.
o b )ect1ves.

.
Repeate d re l'lance upon m1'l't
1 ary s t ra t eg1es

in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Libya illustrate the perception
that the application of limited military force is useful to
achieve goals.

And the Soviet actions in Afghanistan are an

indication that other powers are employing military
strategies in attempting to achieve their goals also.
Revised Strategy of Force
In historical periods, force often had been associated
with brute force or war, but in recent years it has been
argued that "plain war has now been replaced" by a more
refined use of force. 19
Limited force has become regarded
as a projection of state power to establish and maintain
control over other states. 20
In particular, limited force
has become viewed as a method to control other states by
affecting their attitudes, expectations, and resolve. 21
Therefore, the military power of a country is not only
measured by its destructive capability, but by its capacity
to influence the behavior of another country.

A limited

military action can be viewed as a technique of influence, as
a means to political objectives, with states being affected
by the threat of force.

The strategy of using or threatening

force is based on the assumption that the opponent state will
alter its behavior Cif force can alter it at all) because it

8

fears or expects more violence will be used against it if it
does not alter its behavior. 22
A whole range of policies has been devised based upon
the assumption that limited violence is useful to project
state power to alter the behavior of other states.

In

devising these plans, the term strategy has come to be used
interchangeably with the term policy. 23
Specifically,
strategies can be defined as "the art of distributing and
applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy.• 24
The term strategy also implies that a state's military
policies represent "calculated, coherent plans" designed "to
influence the course of international developments in a
desired manner.• 25
Such influence strategies include
displays or shows of force, military force specifically
designed to communicate, influence or coerce, as well as
actual use of mlitary force, as in interventions.

Also, if

economic pressure, propaganda, subversion and diplomacy are
combined with force, then they too may be considered as
strategic policies. 26
Another form of strategic
policymaking has been referred to as "coercive diplomacy."
Coercive diplomacy refers to a situation where force has been
used specifically as a method of communication to induce the
opponent to revise his calculations or behavior. 27
In recent years, there has been a shift in emphasis
regarding the usefulness and strategies of force. 28 While
nuclear war may be feared, limited war and threats of war can

9

be viewed " as techniques of influence, not of destruction1
of coercion and deterrence, not of conquest and defense1 of
bargaining and intimidation.• 29
Military action, then,
would not be viewed as an alternative to bargaining, but as a
process of communication, influence, bargaining, and
coercion.
Moralist and Realist Arguments
There is still controversy between those who are
regarded as moralists and realists.

However, recent

theorizing has further refined conceptual thinking regarding
this topic.

Recent political analysts have argued that the

moralist-realist framework is no longer adequate, that its
dichotomy of views which polarize power and cooperation has
over-simplified matters.
New Conceptualizations
A recent criticism has been directed at the realist
emphasis upon competition and power-seeking as the main
motivation of state behavior. 30 Recent work by Snidal has
emphasized that there is a basic flaw in the realist emphasis
upon the state as a power-seeking actor.

Rather, both

competition and cooperation should

be considered as an

integral aspect of state behavior.

States will collaborate

when it is in their interest to do so.

States do not just

act in their own immediate self-interest, but are guided by
the concept of •strategic rationality.•

This philosophy

'
10

takes into account the possible reactions of other states, as
well as the pursuit of immediate state interests.

Specif-

ically, taking into consideration the long term reactions of
other states could act as a modifying effect upon state
behavior: the incentive not to cooperate on a given issue
would be mitigated by the fear that non-cooperation by one
state would lead to later, non-cooperative behavior by other
states.

If policies are devised from the viewpoint of this

nstrategic rationalityn a more cooperative pattern of interaction could replace the traditional anarchic aspect of the
international scene.
Other analysts have also argued that analyzing
international relations from a moralistic-realist perspective
is inadequate.

Scott and Carr have argued that the state is

not subject to moral principles while involved in policymaking. 31

Therefore, in evaluating foreign policy actions,

nit is something of a category mistake to think that the
principles of a universal ethic are relevant to foreign
policy making.• 32 However, the state must conduct policymaking in an anarchical international environment.

Due to

this situation, the state does have •a moral obligation to
their own citizenry.• 33 Specifically, the state has the
duty to manage international uncertainty for its citizens.
state will be more successful in accomplishing this aim by
adopting a policy which makes selective use of both
power-seeking and order-seeking policies.

Power-seeking

A
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policies continue to be used because:

"Order-seeking

strategies cannot overcome the dilemma of international
distrust.• 34 Further, given the state of the international
environment, it would be unrealistic to expect or even "hope
for the worldwide emergence of brotherly love.• 35 Yet,
while state reliance upon its own power may seem to ensure
its security from the threat of other states, power-seeking
may exacerbate the very problem it is attempting to manage.
Power-seeking by one state may increase power-seeking
strategies in other states. 36 Therefore, states need to be
guided by the concept of "strategic consequentialism."
Following such a concept would mean that "power-seeking and
order-seeking moves would be strategically selected according
to their likely consequences for the security and well-being
of the state Cits citizens) initiating the action.• 37 In
order for policies to be effective, a wide range of options
must be considered1 and strategies need to be calcuated and
recalculated to be certain the desired effect is sustained.
It is necessary for the state to know "when a power-seeking
or an order-seeking strategy will pay the greatest dividends
on any particular issue.• 38 Further, failure to utilize a
"strategic- consequentialist" approach would imply that many
policy options actually would not be considered, or that
options might have been circumvented by premature
actions. 39 To develop truly useful policies, the state
must be aware of the possible ramifications of many

12

strategies, as well as the effect of various state actions
upon other states within the international system.

Only if a

state follows such an approach can the state develop successful strategies and effectively represent its citizens.
Recent analysts would argue, then, that force ought to
be avoided if possible, but that various situations may
warrant or even necessitate the use of force.
mean that force is advocated.

This does not

In fact, avoiding violence in

the international arena could serve both moral and pragmatic
purposes.

Also, these analysts warn that gains incurred by

force in the short run can cause problems in the foreseeable
future.

While resolution of a problem by force might seem to

affect the opponent state only, in the long run all states
will be affected by an arbitrary and unstable inernational
system.
Need for Further Reexamination
Recent theorizing

suggests that older conceptual

frameworks are inadequate and that further investigation of
"strategic rationality" or "strategic consequentialism" would
be beneficial to understand the working of the international
system, and of the U.S. role within that system.

As noted,

it is only by analysis and recalculation that effective state
policies can be devised for the benefit of that state's
citizens.
An examination of U.S. policies in the Caribbean Basin
is particularly useful for evaluating military policies,

---~,

13

since the United States has relied upon military strategies
so often in this area.

Also, viewing U.S. policies in the

Caribbean Basin allows military strategies to be analyzed
from a broad perspective.

Policies can be evaluated in

relationship to their effect upon specific states, to the
whole region, and from the region to the entire international
system.

Local, regional, and global contexts are all impor-

tant. 40

Emphasis upon a broad setting also helps to

emphasize that states are actors which are part of an international arena, an environment providing various constraints
on state actions.

While the United States may have the

military power to influence states to achieve short-term
goals, an examination of such policies may indicate that
military strategies may not be in the long-run best interest
of the United States.
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CHAPTER II
EXAMINATION OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICIES
AND THE USE OF FORCE IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
The term Caribbean Basin refers to the Central American
Therefore, this
Isthmus and Maritime Caribbean nations. 1
area is:
Bounded by the Bahamas in the north and Barbados
to the east, the Caribbean is one vast natural
chain commanding the Atlantic-Pacific and northsouth trade routes. Guyana and Belize are
already traditionally viewed as Caribbean states
but so, too, are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colu~ia, Venezuela,
Suriname, Mexico and French Guiana.
EARLY SOURCES OF THE REGION'S PROBLEMS
In order to analyze and recalculate U.S. policies in
the Caribbean Basin, it is necessary to have an effective
understanding of the region itself.

It is clear from

numerous historical examples that the United States has
intervened often in the Caribbean Basin.

Yet, U.S. policies

of force have not seemed to significantly alter the problems
of the region, and these military strategies have required
repeated employment by the United States.

Furthermore,

responding to each isolated occurance has not been very
helpful:

•something systemic is going on and, until the
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syndrome is diagnosed, treating each isolated recurrence will
get us nowhere.• 3
Part of the difficulty in correctly assessing the
region's problems stems from the individual features of each
nation.

A variety of relationships between the elite, the

government, and the peasants exists due to differing historical, geographic, or social conditions. 4 For example, the
societies of various countries reflect the cultures of the
colonizing counries--the English in Belize, the French in
Haiti, or the Spanish and U.S. influence in Puerto Rico.
Yet most analysts would agree that there are common
historical roots to the region's problems.

Colonialism is a

factor that the Caribbean nations had in common.

In general,

the native populations were displaced from their lands by the
colonizers.

Plantations developed with coffee, bananas, and

sugar predominating as the major export crops.

It has been

argued that the coffee production developed a more dominant
oligarchy which relied more strongly upon the military to
prevent reforms (such as land redistribution) and a consequent loss of the colonizer's power. 5 However, the sugar,
banana, and other business owners also resisted reforms and
maintained extensive control over all aspects of the
Caribbean countries 6 It has been agreed generally that
these large companies and owners operated in their own
interest, making •only a limited contribution" to a country's
7
development.
During this period of time, the Caribbean

20

Basin area was subordinated to European interests.

The

well-being of the region's economy relied upon exports and
was therefore vulnerable to outside forces.

The native

populations suffered, and declined in members.

For example,

it has been estimated that after fifty years of conquest, the
Indian population of El Salvador declined from as many as
500,000 to about 75,000. 8 African slaves were brought into
many areas with the consequence that colonialism even altered
the ethnic structure of the societies.

It has been estimated

that from 1450-1888, some ten million Africans were captured
and transported to the Caribbean area. 9
The inequitable conditions created by colonialism have
contributed to the present-day political instability of the
Caribbean Basin. 10 The exploration, conquest, colonization, slavery, the export economy, the racial and ethnic
admixture have all contributed to the problems of the present
day--including poverty, unemployment, underdevelopment,
economic dependency, social rivalries, ethnic animosities,
weak identity, and political disunity. 11

U. S. RESPONSES TO THE REGION'S PROBLEMS
Instability and weakness in the Caribbean Basin has led
to intervention in its affairs by many countries, including
the United States.

While the United States has suggested or

helped to implement reform measures, or has extended economic
aid, over time the United States has also employed a variety
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of military strategies in the Caribbean Basin.

U.S. military

influence attempts have included shows of force, especially
naval ones.

Threats, both implicit and explicit, also have

been made to Caribbean Basin states.

When threats or other

military signals have failed to alter the behavior of states
in a desired fashion, the United States often has resorted to
invasion.

Other military strategies have also been employed.

For example, coercive diplomacy was employed in both the
Cuban Missile Crisis and the use of covert activities in
Nicaragua.

While the United States has worked with inter-

national or regional organizations, it is clear from these
historical examples that the United States will resort
ultimately to military strategies if this seems the best way
to achieve its objectives.
Ad Hoc Responses
In spite of its close proximity to the Caribbean
Basin, the United States has often been preoccupied with
other matters with the consequence that policymakers have
directed varying degrees of attention to this area.

For

example, at the time the area of the Caribbean Basin was
being colonized by European powers, the United States was
involved in establishing its own independence and in expanding its own frontiers.

Further settlement, continuing

efforts to develop industrialization, as well as internal
political matters all consumed much American energy. However,
over time, the United States policymakers directed more
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attention to the Caribbean.

Yet, U.S. policies have been

further complicated by the individual preferences of key
policymakers, as with Teddy Roosevelt's emphasis on the •big
stick" in contrast to Jimmy carter's insistence on observing
human rights.
U.S. Early Involvement
Changing Perceptions.

Regardless of the lack of a

long term formalized policy, U.S. policymakers gradually
became more cognizant of the Caribbean Basin (and, in fact,
of all Latin America).

In the early 1800s U.S. attention

was drawn to the Caribbean as several Caribbean Basin
colonies acquired their independence.

For example, Haiti

declared its independence in 1804 (and France agreed to this
in 1825); and in 1821 Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala
each declared their independence.

However, newly gained

independence did not bring freedom from the interference of
other countries.
Even though the United States was involved with its own
internal affairs, U.S. policymakers continued to become aware
of the importance of the Caribbean Basin.

Thomas Jefferson

stated, for example, that it was essential to "our tranquility and commerce ••• " to consider this area under general
. fl uence. 12
U.S. in

In 1823 the Monroe Doctrine was

proclaimed, with the declared purpose to limit European--but
not American--interference in the Western hemisphere.
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In spite of the Monroe Doctrine, it has been argued
that "the United States did not really become involved in the
Caribbean Basin area until after the Spanish-American
War.• 13 This war can be viewed as the event which drew the
United States into a series of interventions in the Caribbean
and Latin America--thereby drawing the United States into
world politics. 14 In support of this argument, it can be
noted that U.S. influence increased following 1898.

For

example, in 1898 Puerto Rico became a U.S. possession1 the
Spanish were driven out of Cuba, with Cuba created as a U.S.
protectorate in 1903, and placed under U.S. military
occupation for four years.

Also, in 1903, the United States

was involved in supporting Panama in its secession from
Colombia.

In fact, in order to support its preferred

policies, the United States had militarily intervened in the
Panamanian area thirteen times by 1903. 15 Not only had the
U.S. embarked upon

a course of interventions, but by the

early twentieth century, the United States had become "the
hegemonic military, political, and economic power in the
region.• 16
By 1904, Theodore Roosevelt had announced his corollary
to the Monroe Doctrine, that "the United States would be
responsible for the conduct of Latin American governments,•
whether or not they had any ties to any foreign powers.17
During this period of Roosevelt's "big stick• approach to
international relations, U.S. policy came to mean more than
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merely preventing foreign

intervention~

rather, the idea

developed that the United States would have the responsibility to exercise "international police power" to correct
"any deficiencies in the internal character of Latin American
regimes that might encourage foreign intrusion.• 18
At the time of the Corollary, political and economic
instability were perceived to be the threats of particular
concern. 19 The United States responded to various
instabilities in a variety of ways, including threats,
interventions, and the drawing up of treaties--often made at
gunpoint. 2
For example, in 1906 political instability

°

occurred in Guatemala, leading to a full scale war between
Guatemala and El Salvador.

This led President Theodore

Roosevelt to send the U.S. warship Marblehead to the coast
of El Salvador.

The extent of U.S. influence is clearly

demonstrated by the fact that the cease-fire between
El Salvador and Guatemala was signed on board the
Marblehead~

and when the cease-fire threatened to disin-

tegrate into war in 1907, the United States again intervened
militarily. 21
Dollar and Gunboat Diplomacy.
Roosevelt's administration emphasized

While Theodore

u.s.

military action,

it has been argued that during the next few years William
Howard Taft "replaced bullets with dollars in his policy
toward the region.• 22 Taft's emphasis on furthering the
U.S. economic interests has often caused this period of
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American foreign policy to be referred to as •dollar
diplomacy.•

The United States continued to expand its

commercial interests in the Caribbean Basin area.

Americans,

for example, consolidated sugar interests in Cuba, the
Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
However, the •use of military force was never, in fact,
totally abandoned.• 23 While the United States may have
tried to avoid using military strategies for political
purposes, nevertheless U.S. force was often used to protect
American economic interests. 24 As a result of the threat
or use of threat, other scholars have referred to such U.S.
military strategies as •gunboat diplomacy.• 25 Such policies have not been restricted to a particular historical
period, but continue to the present.
Security interests.

During

World War I the United

States continued to respond to perceived security problems.
For example, after the building of the Panama Canal, Haiti
was considered to have considerable strategic value; •the
sixty-mile stretch of water between Haiti and Cuba was part
of the only direct water link between the eastern coast of
the United States and the Panama Cana1.• 26 Political
instability occurred in Haiti, but United States marines also
invaded Haiti in 1915 •as part of a general plan for the
strategic and economic control of the Caribbean region.•27
Once a new government was in place, and U.S. influence seemed
assured, then the policy of the U.S. administration primarily
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stressed Haitian strict debt repayments to ensure a positive
economic environment for U.S. investors. 28 In order to
facilitate this goal, the U.S. marines assumed management of
the customs houses and established martial law. 29 Military
bases in other areas also assumed greater importance during
the war years, as Guantanamo in Cuba or Chaguaranas in
Trinidad.

In 1917 •to forestall the possibility of Germany

constructing a naval base on the Virgin Island of St. John,
the United States purchased the island from Denmark, along
with St. Croix, part of St. Martin and St. Thomas.• 30 And,
in the 1920s, the U.S. government was also concerned about
the risk of security in Mexico due to "Bolshevik
influences.• 31
Many other examples of U.S. military policies can be
cited.

For example, U.S. marines invaded Cuba in 1917 and

stayed until 1923 •putting down strikes and protecting United
States property.• 32 The United States also occupied the
Dominican Republic from 1916 until 1924, establishing martial
law and a U.S. military government. 33 In fact, between
1898 and 1920, U.S. troops landed in the Central American
region twenty times. 34
Evaluation of U.S. Early Involvement.

As noted,

inequitable conditions created by colonialism have
contributed to instability and poverty in the Caribbean
Basin.

The United States has often responded to events or

conditions in this area with military strategies.

These
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strategies may have seemed to serve the immediate goals of
the United States--such as as maintaining political order or
providing a favorable economic climate for U.S. investments.
However, over a period of time the seemingly successful use
of military force caused other problems.

For example, in

Haiti the United States marines imposed martial law in 1915
to ensure a stable environment.

Yet, a growing nationalist

movement opposed this action, leading to a demand for the
withdrawal of U.S. troops which was agreed to in 1934. 35
Also, these various military poiicies contributed to a
negative perception regarding the United States.

It has

been argued that a negative attitude toward the United States
is a •permanent factor• in areas of the Caribbean1 36 and
that past U.S. military policies now mean that •political
change in Central America will likely entail no small dose
of Anti-Yankee sentiment.• 37 This anti-Yankee sentiment
has recently been expressed by Daniel Oduber, the past
president of Costa Rica.

In 1985 Oduber wrote that average

Central Americans feel as if they are dominated and threatened by •armed thugs1• these thugs are •not the Leninist
commissars but the armed sergeants trained by the United
States.• 38
Therefore, early U.S. responses to the Caribbean Basin
proved inadequate.

Lasting international order was not

achieved1 the region's problems persisted1 and U.S. military
actions created a negative perception toward the United
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States.

Unfortunately, the United States still pursued such

actions through the next decades.

Temporary Restraints
After World War I the United States had again
emphasized world trade and U.S. investments.

The United

Fruit company expanded, becoming a powerful force within the
Caribbean region.

For example, by the 1930s, the United

Fruit Company had become the largest landholder, employer,
and exporter in Guatemala. 39 In fact, the United Fruit
company became known as •El Pulpo,• The Octopus, and emerged
as a •formidable foreign political influence in the
region.• 40

Americans also became involved in oil in

Trinidad, bauxite in Jamaica and Guyana, and in manufacturing
and tourism in various areas.

Many of the Caribbean Basin

countries continued to have political instability, and the
United States again often responded to problems by choosing
military strategies.
However, the stock market crash of 1929 preoccupied
Americans, causing a temporary restraining effect on U.S.
military policies.
Great Depression.

The Great Depression caused

worldwide social and political stress, which included the
Caribbean Basin.

For example, El Salvador had profited from

a successful coffee industry, with coffee earnings having
produced 95.5% of export profits, funded central and local
government, financed internal development (roads, ports,
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railroads), and created employment or even fortunes for many
individuals. 41

However, the worldwide depression sent

coffee prices downward1 thousands of peasants had no work,
with even the wealthy suffering.
followed.

Political repercussions

Indian uprisings occurred, and worker's revolts

erupted in the cities.
returned to El Salvador.

In 1930, August!n Farabundo Mart!
In March, 1930, he founded the

Salvadoran Communist Party.

He, and other leaders, planned

an armed revolt.

Eventually, the El Salvadoran army executed
Mart! and as many as 30,000 Salvadorans. 42
At other periods the United States may have been more
likely to have intervened in El Salvador.

However, at a time

when the United States was preoccupied with its own problems,
the oligarchs within the country had responded to this
growing unrest with repression. 43 Still, even though the
United States did not actually intervene, it did provide a
"show-of-force." During the rebellion, the United States
supported the goverment by stationing two destroyers and a
naval cruiser carrying Marines off the coast of El Salvador1
and the U.S. Marine Air Groups stationed in Nicaragua were
also alerted. 44
Good Neighbor Policy.

Although the "Good Neighbor

Policy" is popularly associated with Franklin Roosevelt (who
used the term in his inaugural address), President Hoover had
previously initiated the policy.

In Argentina Hoover prom-

ised to abstain from intervention in the internal affairs of
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the nations south of the border, and he arranged to remove
U.S. troops from Haiti and Nicaragua.

Hoover even formally

repudiatd the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
Evaluation of U.S. policies.

Analysts have disagreed

over U.S. military restraint shown during this period.

It

has been argued that this shift in U.S. policy was not due to
economic or military weakness, but was the result •of moral
inhibitions.• 45 Other analysts have stated that in practice the •Good Neighbor Policy• simply meant the abandonment
of international entanglements at a time the United States
was •preoccupied with economic matters.• 46
For example,
the United States had previously intervened in Nicaragua to
ensure the second term of Adolfo Diaz.

Rather than inter-

preting the withdrawal of the marines as a moralistic action,
it can be argued also that when the U.S. marines proved
unable to capture Sandino, they were withdrawn (January
1933>. 47
Even if the United States may have been somewhat
restrained by moral inhibitions or practical considerations
during the time of the •Good Neighbor Policy,• the United
States presence remained dominant in the Caribbean Basin and
the United States still resorted to military strategies.
•shows-of-force• were still designed to influence the
behavior of other countries--as in Cuba, in the 1930s, when
30 warships were

sta~ioned

.
. t eres t s. 48
American
in

around the island to protect
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World War II and Strategic Imeratives
With the U.S. involvement in World War II the United
States once again had less time for intervention in the
Caribbean Basin countries.

However, the United States

recognized the strategic importance of the area.
war years, the
increased.

u.s.

During the

military presence in the Caribbean

Expanded military installations were constructed

in Panama, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands1 bases were
also set up in Trinidad, Barbados, St. Lucia, and British
Guiana.
Panama Canal and Defense Treaties.
was regarded as particularly strategic.

The Panama Canal
In 1936 the United

States had signed a General Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation, 49 and had relinquished the right to unilateral
intervention in Panama's political affairs.

However, that

treaty did allow the United States to obtain access to
additional lands and waters relating to the defense and
modernization of the canal.

And in 1942, the U.S. Panama

Base Convention 50 was signed, allowing the United States
over 100 new military and telecommunications facilities in
Panama.
As well as increasing attention to the Panama Canal
Zone, the United States took other steps to increase its
security.

In 1947 the United States and the nations of Latin

America completed the Rio Treaty. 51

Security was
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emphasized by the phrase in which the parties agreed that •an
armed attack by any State against an American State shall be
considered as an attack against all the American States,• and
consequently, each one of the states agreed to aiding the
attacked state. 52 The Rio treaty was soon followed by the
creation of the Organization of American States 53 in
Bogota, Colombia, in 1948.

While the OAS provided for state

security, it also established guidelines for hemispheric conduct whch ruled out intervention by one state in the affairs
of another.
Evaluation of U.S. Policies.

It has been argued that

it is the duty of a state to manage international uncertainty
in the best interests of its citizens.

While it may have

been the intent of the U.S. policymakers to achieve this
goal, U.S. strategies have not accomplished this.

Previous

U.S. military interferences in Panama had negative effects
upon the U.S.-Panamanian
of war.

relationship even during the time

For example, Arnulfo Arias was elected as President

of Panama in 1940 on a platform which emphasized strong
•anti-Yankee nationalism.• 54 Although he was overthrown
the next year--when he resisted U.S. pressure for more military bases during World War II--his ideas and anti-Yankee
sentiment remained popular.

He was so popular, in fact, that

he was reelected in 1949 (although again removed by a coup in
1951).

Furthermore, during the World War II period,

Panamanian nationalism erupted in repeated riots in reaction
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to the United States demands for more bases to defend the
Canal.SS

And, finally, in 1947, mass protests prevented

an agreement to increase the U.S. military presence in
Panama. 56
The past--and continuing--u.s. military presence in
Panama still negatively affects the U.S.-Panamanian relationship.

The United States initial involvement in the

establishment of the Panamanian state and its subsequent
military (as well as economic and political) influence in
Panama has resulted in Panama's resentment toward the United
States.
ment.

Many examples can be cited to indicate the resentFor example, in 1964 anger against U.S. authorities

Cwho had restrained Panamanian students from positioning
their national flag beside a U.S. flag at a high school in
the Canal Zone) resulted in 30,000 Panamanians demonstrating
in the streets of Panama City.

By the time the riots ended,

the physical damage exceeded $2 million; 28 deaths had
occurred, and 300 more were wounded.

Panama's resentment

toward the United States in regard to the ownership and
operation of the Canal itself has abated somewhat.

In 1977

the United States and Panama finally reached an agreement
regarding the Canal, with the United States retaining the
right •to manage and operate the canal until the year 2000,•
and with the United States having •perpetual authority• to
use its military •to protect and defend the cana1•--as well
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as having "the perpetual right to build a new sea-level canal
ten miles to the west." 57
Yet, there is resentment concerning some of the terms
of the treaty 58 and concerning the continuing U.S. presence
in the area.

For example, the United States continues to

control the School of Americas military training center.

It

is possible that such issues "related to the continuing
U.S. military presence could mobilize national resentment
• w59
again.
The Panama Canal and the treaty systems established in
the 1940s have continued to be important to the United
States; and the Caribbean Basin countries no doubt hoped the
OAS Charter would involve a new relationship with the United
States.

The OAS Charter could be viewed as a step toward

less military intervention by the United States:
For the first time it seemed to free them (the
Latins) from the fear of the big stick which had
been applied against them so often in the past.
For the United States, as well, it was a radical
break with the past, a final and explicit repudiation
of 'gunboat diplomacy' and a recognition that the
Monroe Doctrine could no longer be used as an excuse
for unilateral interventions desigg d to punish
or intimidate recalcitrant States. 0
However, the treaty systems did not lead to less military
interference from the United States.

As the Soviet Union and

communism became an ever-increasing worry, the tension
between the Soviet Union and the United States evolved into
the Cold War.

And, the heightened tension between the
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superpowers coincided with a new instability among the
political governments of the Caribbean Basin area.
Cold War Influences
During the Cold War period, U.S. policies particularly
emphasized the necessity of maintaining control over the
Caribbean Basin; it was considered essential for U.S. welfare
to exclude the left from power.

In fact, keeping the left

from power was defined "as furthering U.S. national
interest" 61 and viewed as preventing potential military
threats.

During this time it was a consistent policy

assumption that the United States must prevent leftist
movements from becoming leftist governments, for communist
success in one country would provide a platform for the
revolution to spread to the next country (domino theory>. 62
If U.S. diplomatic efforts or development efforts failed to
provide the necessary stability in the Caribbean Basin, then
the United States relied upon military force, as can be
demonstrated by events in Guatemala, Cuba, and the Dominican
Republic.
Guatemala. Guatemala in the 1950s represented an area
which was affected by Cold War perceptions.

Reforms had been

attempted by the government of Jacobo Arbenz which could be
interpreted as long needed restitution of economic inequalities or which could be viewed as extreme socialistic/Marxist
programs that threatened democracy in Guatemala.

It can be

argued that the promise of Arbenz to reform the economy of
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the country was not totally revolutionary1 yet such reform
effort "inevitably meant" confronting the large U.S. corporations in Guatemala, notably United Fruit, International
Railways of Central America, and Electric Bond and Share
Company. 63

In 1953 and early 1954 the government began a

land reform program, expropriating over a thousand estates
and distributing this land to over 100,000 families. 64

The

Guatemalan government also expropriated 387,000 acres of land
from the United Fruit Company. 65
extreme to many.

These reforms seemed

When Arbenz then legalized the Communist

Party the new government seemed even more radical.

Communist

involvement in the Arbenz government was in actuality limited
to a "small number of Communists" in "low-level cabinet
positions." 66

Further, the Arbenz government can be viewed

as "an elected government" which was attempting to carry out
"a program of indiginous economic and political liberalizations. "67

However, the reform actions of Guatemala were

viewed from a Cold War perspective:

"The United States

government had determined that communism should not gain a
foothold in this hemisphere." 68

In 1954, the U.S. govern-

ment stated it feared the growth of communist power in
Guatemala, and the United States pressured several reluctant
delegations to secure passage of a key resolution at the
Tenth Inter-American Conference (held at Caracas, 1954). 69
The resolution declared that the domination or control of the
political institutions of any American state by the
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international communist movement would endanger the peace and
security of the hemisphere, and would necessitate a meeting
of consultation to recommmend appropriate measures.

Such a

meeting was proposed soon after the resolution was approved,
but before the meeting could be assembled the Guatemalan
government was overthrown by u.s.-supported forces. 70
Once again, the United States had resorted to military
strategies. 71 President Eisenhower had authorized a coup
in Guatemala.

Financial resources were provided to begin

covert action against Arbenz.

The CIA also supported an

exile army in Honduras and Nicaragua and persuaded ex-Colonel
Castillo Armas Ca right-wing Guatemalan military member) to
lead these forces.

The CIA then established a small air

force in Nicaragua and the Panama Canal Zone to support
Armas's invasion by bombing Guatemalan cities.

These planes

were piloted by U.S. Navy airmen who reportedly served as
mercenaries.

The communist threat seemed removed; Arbenz was

forced from Guatemala to Mexico; and Armas took power; and
all expropriated land was returned to the United Fruit
Company.
Events in Guatemala seemed to demonstrate the utility
of American military policies.

Lloyd Etheredge has argued:

•Eisenhower, and other politicians, learned
that covert operations were a useful method for
cold war interventions in underdeveloped countries.
After the Guatemala success, the role of CIA
covert ac;~vities in American foreign policy
expanded.
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In fact, Etheredge has claimed that the policymakers
perception of U.S. strategic success in Guatemala led to
the eventual shaping of the plans for the Bay of Pigs
.
.
73
invasion.

Cuba.

Cuba represented another area which was

affected by Cold War attitudes.

In Cuba, once again seeking

to achieve political stability, the United States had
supported Fulgencio Batista.

The United States operated on

the assumption that a strong government, backed by the
military, was the most capable of preventing the emergence
of a communist government. 74 However, the Cuban revolution
occurred in 1959, with Fidel Castro, a self-proclaimed
Marxist, succeeding to power.

Cuba turned increasingly to

the Soviet Union for assistance.
President Eisenhower responded to this situation by
endorsing the supplying of arms to counter-revolutionaries
within Cuba.

At this time, •the CIA was working closely with

Cuban exiles in Florida who carried out acts of sabotage and
even bomb attacks on Cuba from the air.• 75 As Castro
continued to further his relationship with the Soviet Union,
Eisenhower endorsed a CIA recommendation" to begin to train
and arm Cuban exiles for an invasion,• with Guatemala being
used as a base for these operations. 76
It was actually in 1961, during the Kennedy
Administration, that the Bay of Pigs invasion occurred.
invasion force of 1,400 men was assembled, with the Cuban
underground and American Air Force planning to assist the

An
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ex-Batista supporters and mercenaries. 77
of

Due to the extent

u.s. support for this invasion, this has been referred to

as a

" CIA

.
.
• 78
surroga t e 1nvas1on.

The Bay of Pigs was

unsuccessful and a humiliating experience for U.S.
policymakers.
The United States once again confronted the Soviets and
the Cubans during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. 79 In
October, 1962, U.S. policymakers considered a range of
policies to deal with the missiles that U-2 photos revealed
the Soviets were placing in Cuba.

Peaceful options, such as

working through the OAS or through negotiators were rejected,
being considered either ineffective or so slow-moving that
the missiles would be operational by the time discussions and
debates were completed.

Extreme military actions as conduct-

ing an invasion or mounting an air strike were finally eliminated as useful strategies.

Choosing these options, for

example, would involve killing Soviet advisors and technicians as well as Cubans, and would engender a greater risk of
mlitary confrontation with the Soviets.
The option finally selected--a naval quarantine--was a
military strategy that the United States hoped would be
effective.

First, the policy was stated by President Kennedy

on nationwide television.

Kennedy clearly explained (and

continued to repeat over the next days) the American position.

The Soviet Union was expected to dismantle the mis-

siles (which the United States regarded as offensive rather
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than defensive> and Soviet ships would not be allowed to pass
thorugh the naval quarantine if they were carrying missiles

or other equipment which would make partially developed
missiles operational.
To make the threat of using force seem more believable
to Khruschev, Kennedy backed his words with actions.

To

emphasize American determination military aircraft were
orderd to bases within striking distance of Cuba.

Almost 200

naval ships were gathered into a task force, and 200,000 men
were placed on alert status. 80
Eventually, the Soviet Union did agree to dismantle the
missiles.

In return, the United States guaranteed it would

not invade Cuba.
Dominican Republic.

The United States had previously

intervened in this area many times.

For example, the United

States had occupied the Dominican Republic from 1916 to 1924,
with Dominican affairs administered directly by the U.S.
military government. 81 In 1930, Rafael Trujillo Molina
seized power in a revolt and was elected president later that
year.

He then ruled as dictator for thirty-one years.
During the Trujillo years the United States had no need

to intervene.

Trujillo kept tight control over the country,

both politically and economically (even controlling an
estimated 65-85% of the country's economic wealth>.8 2
However, Trujillo was assassinated in 1961.
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After the assassination the next few years were
characterized by unrest.

Trujillo's assets came under state

control following his death, and the new President Juan Bosch
resisted pressures to denationalize Trujillo's property. Further, he "sought to limit the power of foreign capital and
local landowners while def ending the rights of the
peasantry." 83
Evidence exists that the United States, becoming
alarmed at the situation in the Dominican Republic, lent
support to Bosch's opposition.

In October 1963 Bosch was

overthrown, and it has been suggested that the leader of the
coup was conditionally supported by Kennedy. 84 Further,
the new head of government was Donald Reid Cabral who was
reputed to be a local CIA agent. 85 Bosch was successful in
regaining his power in a coup in April 1965, but this led to
the CIA immediately attempting to set up an alternative junta
under Colonel Benoit.

Hearings before the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee later in the year revealed that on
April 28 there was:
••• a cabled request from Benoit to US Ambassador
Bennett for American troops 'because a Communist
takeover threatens'. But U.S. intelligence reports
had stated that same day that no more than two of
the 'prime leaders of the rebel forces (were men)
with a long history of Communist association.'
Ambassador Bennett then informed Benoit that
American troops could only be brought in if the
justification became the need to protect
American lives. Benoit's second cable read:
'Regarding my earlier request, I wish 6o add
that American lives are in danger ••• • 8
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It would appear that Benoit's cable provided the
justification for a direct U.S. policy of using force.

That

same day the United States ordered 400 marines from bases in
the Caribbean to the Dominican Republic; later, a further
20,000 U.S. marines were sent by President Johnson to deal
with the communist threat.
On May 2, 1965 the president proclaimed what soon
became known as the Johnson Doctrine:
Revolution in any country is a matter for that
country to deal with. It becomes a matter for
hemispheric action only when the object is ;he
establishment of a Communist dictatorship. 8
In a nationwide broadcast, President Johnson emphasized the
need for hemispheric security by stating: "The American
nations cannot, must not, and will not permit the establishment of another communist government in the Western
·
h ere. n88
Hemisp

The U.S. invasion had immediate results.

Juan Bosch,

who had been democratically elected in 1963, was prevented
from returning to power.

A year after the U.S. invasion, an

election was held between Juan Bosch and Joazuin Baluger, who
was supported by the United States.

After Baluger was

elected, the remaining U.S. troops were withdrawn.
Evaluation of U.S. Policies.

As has been documented,

during this early Cold War period the United States demonstrated that it would use military strategies when they
seemed useful.

In one respect, the policies employed by the

United States in the Caribbean Basin seemed successful.
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Reform movements that might have furthered communism were
halted in Guatemala and the Dominican Republic while Cuban

and Soviet military influence was limited by the Soviet
agreement to withdraw its missiles from Cuba.
of

u.s.

Still, aspects

actions suggested problems with these policies.

In Guatemala a U.S. approved order was restored, but
unrest has remained.

As previously noted, poverty and

inequality are the real sources of instability; therefore,
imposed order that does not address these problems is only
temporary. 89 There is a clear need for reform in
Guatemala.

For instance, •in Guatemala the top two percent

of the population receives 25 percent of the income, while
the bottom 50 percent receives from 10 to 15 percent.• 90
Yet those who would advocate change have been labeled as
•communists• by the military and oligarchy. 91 In fact,
•since the fall of Arbenz, elections and reformist parties
have meant little in terms of fundamental change.• 92
Unfortunately, the United States has aided in the suppression
of reform by its support of the military and oligarchy. 93
Furthermore, the U.S. interference and sponsorship of political violence has severely damaged the Guatemalan political
system itself. 94 Testimony before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in 1967 indicated that the U.S.-aided
alliance between the military and oligarchy did •1ittle to
improve military respect for civilian authority and constitutional processes.• 95
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It would appear that the fear of communism in Guatemala
may have limited certain political choices.

It has been sug-

gested that pursuing a course of "strategic consequentialism"
is the most effective way of managing international uncertainty and that policy options must be constantly recalculated in order to achieve the most effective U.S. action.
Yet, events in Guatemala suggest that "once Arbenz had been
perceived as a communist the die was cast" and he must be
stopped. 96

Such a response to communism and reforms may

prevent other useful options from being selected.

In 1967

Senator Fulbright suggested that American foreign policy
needed to be more effective and realistic:
American interests are better served by supporting
nationalism than by opposing communism, and when
the two are encountered in close association it
it in our interest to accept a communist government, rather than to undertake the cruel and all
but impossible tas~ of suppressing a genuinely
national movement. 7
In dealing with Cuban problems, U.S. policies regarding
the Bay of Pigs invasion seem clearly non-utilitarian;
strategies during the Cuban Missile Crisis can be interpreted
as more useful.
The CIA sponsored covert activities and the Bay of Pigs
invasion were not successful.

For example, the underground

networks supported by the CIA and disaffected Cubans "were
almost always" infiltrated by Castro supporters1 supplies of
munitions sent to Cuba were "frequently intercepted;"
clandestine cells were "not well organized;" and teams sent
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to Cuba to infiltrate Cuban groups were wpicked upw within a
.
98
s h ort time.

Further, the American-supported bombing

raids in Cuba have been characterized as having wno obvious
effect" except "to increase the rate of executions" of the
suspected anti-Castro Cubans. 99 In fact, in spite of
covert policies, Castro's regime "not only survivedw but his
"influence appeared to grow."lOO

The Bay of Pigs invasion

was so unsuccessful that one analyst wrote Kennedy had "been
thoroughly defeated by Castro on the beaches in 1961 ••• "lOl
Numerous problems occurred during the invasion itself.

Flaws

concerning the military operations included incomplete or
inaccurate information regarding the location of reefs or
microwave radio stations, the dependence on untested new
outboard motors, the utilization of impractical landing
craft, and the lack of an effective back-up communication
system. 102
Policymakers specifically have been criticized
regarding their choice of the entire general strategy.

They

have been charged with using poor judgment in thinking that
previously successful Guatemalan covert policies could be
altered and applied to seemingly similar covert actions in
103
Cuba.
It has been pointed out that even in Guatemala
the U.S. military plan only succeeded by a narrow margin; and
in Guatemala u.s.-supported forces only had to contend with a
limited military force loyal to Arbenz while the Castro
104
forces numbered over 200,00o.
Policymakers have also

---i
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been criticized for failing to consider fully the possible
consequences of an unsuccessful invasion:

•Kennedy and his

advisers did not consider the implications of a prolonged
struggle that might have embroiled the United States had
Kennedy not inadvertently scuttled his own operation.• 105
•The missile crisis deliberations showed that a marked
improvement in the policy process could occur.• 106
In the CUban Missile Crisis a wide range of options was
considered, finally resulting in the choice of a naval
blockade.

Analysts tend to describe U.S. military policies

in this incident as •successful,• since the blockade did
achieve the objective of limiting Soviet power in the
Caribbean area at that time, and this was accomplished
without resorting to actual warfare. 107
It can be argued that international relations involves
a degree of risk-taking and that a state might deliberately
choose such a policy to represent the interests of its
citizens.

However, U.S. policies during the Cuban Missile

Crisis did involve high risk-taking as well as the threat of
escalation:
If the Cuban blockade had failed, there were
few remaining options that President Kennedy
could have used without triggering war. Efforts
by strategists and civilian leaders to transform
force into a highly refined, discriminating
instrument that will support an assertive foreign
policy and also be appropriate for crisis manfij§ment eventually break down if pushed too far.
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The fear of communism also motivated the United States
to intervene in the Dominican Republic.

Like the U.S. inter-

vention in Guatemala, this U.S. military action •sent a
signal throughout Latin America that the United States was
more comfortable with military governments than with
democratically elected reformist governments.• 109 To many
states it appeared the United States would be prepared to
intervene with military force if perceived U.S. interests
seemed "sufficiently threatened.• 110 Inter-American
treaties--with their accompanying declarations--are quoted by
the United States if they can be made applicable to justify
U.S. actions1 otherwise, these international agreements are
. 1 y d'isregar d e d • 111
s1mp
As a result of perceived U.S. successes in these
confrontations and the continuing fear of communism, U.S.
policymakers continued to rely upon military strategies in
the Caribbean area. 112 For example, in the 1960s the canal
Zone became a center for training in counter-insurgency
techniques, and •by 1971 military investment in the Canal
Zone was estimated to be $U.S. 4,800 million.• 113 And,
when guerilla groups appeared in Guatemala and Nicaragua in
the early 1960s, the United States responded with •operation
Brotherhood," a series of naval exercises, designed to
discourage any more political instability.
In 1964 the United States encouraged the establishment
of the Central American Defense Council CCONDECA).

Although
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the United States still maintained a military presence in the
region, the establishment of CONDECA indicated the American
preference for employing national and neighboring armed
forces to protect U.S. interests rather than sending in
.
American
so ld'iers. 114

The United States experience in

Vietnam would reinforce this preference.
Vietnam Influence
During the latter years of the Johnson administration,
Vietnam consumed official Washington's attention.

During the

Nixon administration the Vietnam experience influenced the
American decision-makers' perspectives regarding international relations, including views of the Caribbean Basin.
In particular, American policies continued to stress military
security, rather than economic development and reform in the
. area. 115
Cari. bb ean Basin
There were several developments in the Caribbean that
seemed disturbing to U.S. decision-makers.

The •domino

theory" was subscribed to by many; just as the United States
had to worry about the "domino theory" in Southeast Asia,
many U.S. State Department spokesmen worried about countries
in the Caribbean becoming communist and therefore creating a
"sea of splashing dominoes" in that area. 116 During the
1960s and 1970s many countries in the Caribbean Basin had
become independent (in the 1960s--Jamaica, Trinidad, Tobago,
Guyana and Barbados, and in the 1970s--Bahamas, Grenada,
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Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Suriname).

However, as

in other historical periods, independence did not bring about
social or political transformation of these areas.
and social inequalities continued to exist.

Political

Further, Cuba

demonstrated an interest in promoting socialist policies and
governments in the Caribbean, a fact which concerned the
United States. 117 For example, Guyana's government had
moved toward socialism1 in 1973, Castro visited Georgetown,
and Guyana appeared to have a very radical government.
Jamaica also seemed to be leaning toward radicalism.

Michael

Manley had come to off ice in 1972 and Jamaica proceded to
embark upon socialistic reforms.

In Grenada, in March 1979,

an insurrection was launched and the government of Eric Gairy
was replaced by a government under Maurice Bishop which
preceded to forge links with the Cubans and Soviets.

Other

new governments established during the 1970s, as St. Lucia
and St. Vincent, also stressed reform and socialistic
measures.

Since these new governments appeared within months

of the Grenadian revolution of 1979 it might have seemed as
if the Cuban experience would promote communism in other
areas.
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands also claimed U.S.
attention during this time.

Puerto Rico had been a

self-governing "Commonwealth" since 1950, associated with the
United States.

However, by 1975, Puerto Rico had serious

so
problems.

For example, "seventy per cent of the population

was sufficiently impoverished to be eligible for U.S. food
coupons." 118 Theoretically Puerto Rico had internal
political independence, but questions regarding the colonial
nature of the relationship of Puerto Rico to the United
States were being raised in the international community.

For

example, in 1972 Cuba brought the Puerto Rican issue to the
U.N. Committee on Decolonization.

"The United States denied

that Puerto Rico was a colony and maintained that the issue
was an 'internal' one of no concern to the international
community." 119 Yet, in 1978, a U.N. resolution by the
Decolonization Committee stressed that "only through a
complete transfer of power from the United States to the
people of Puerto Rico could the latter be able to decide
freely its political future," and the committee asked the
United States to present a plan providing for the future
political independence of the island. 120 However, the
United States government has stressed support for statehood
rather than for independence. 121 In the case of the Virgin
Islands, they were bought by the United States from Denmark
in 1917, and these islands have a similar relationship to the
United States with the exception that there is less internal
autonomy than in Puerto Rico.

Although these areas have been

of concern to the United States (especially with recent
terrorist activities), the United States has chosen to rely
. .
on po 1 ic1es
ot h er t h an m1'l't
i ary ones. 122
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The U.S. experiences in Vietnam emphasized the problems
of relying upon military strategies.

Various analysts began

to challenge the past U.S. policies of military force in the
Caribbean Basin.

For example, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued

that the United States should review its priorities, particularly the hard stand on anti-communism and hemispheric
security. 123

In 1974, the Commission on United States-

Latin American Relations which was headed by Sol Linowitz,
recommended that the United States abandon military intervention as a weapon of hegemonic assertion.

Specifically,

Linowitz argued that the United States should "keep local and
regional conflicts outside the context of the super power
relationship," and should not regard all conflict as battlegrounds of the cold war. 124

The Commission did, however,

retain the traditional view that "Cuba was a special problem"
to the United States, requiring U.S. policies aimed at
. .
res t ra1n1ng
cub a. 125

Alternatives to Force in the Caribbean Basin
The United States has not only relied upon military
strategies in the Caribbean Basin; rather, U.S. policies
reflect a mixture of ad hoc responses to perceived
problems.

126

At various times U.S. policies have stressed

being a "Good Neighbor" as well as the threats of coercive
diplomacy or the actual force of intervention.
The "Good Neighbor" policy and general attempts to
promote reform have already been discussed.

However, during
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the 1960s and 1970s two alternative attempts to U.S. military
strategies are particularly noteworthy--the Alliance for
Progress and the emphasis on human rights as developed by
Carter.
Alliance for Progress.

Recognizing the problems of

inequality and the need for reform, President Kennedy
announced the Alliance for Progress.

The United States

pledged twenty billion dollars in aid for Latin America.
Government officials announced that the United States hoped
to help eliminate the problems that caused nations of the
Caribbean area to turn toward communism.

And, the Alliance

for Progress did give impetus to reform groups--popular
associations and new political parties that sought the kinds
of revisions that the Alliance had promoted. 127 However,
the Alliance failed to produce "the enduring political and
economic reforms" that had been proposed.

This was partly

due to the fact that U.S. policymakers seriously underestimated the entrenched power and the tenacious resilience
of the traditional upper classes to resist sharing their
. ' l eges. 128
privi

Although government officials emphasized the Alliance
for Progress as an alternative to military strategies, "the
Alliance also included a military security component designed
to def eat any revolutionary challenge that might preempt or
disrupt attempts at reform." 129 For example, the School of
the Americas was utilized as a military training center for
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.
coun t er1nsurgency
measures. 130

Also, the U.S. Agency for

International Development (AID) was established1 regional
police forces were provided with training and supplies-including general arms, antiriot guns, communications and
.
.
t • 131
equ1pmen
t ranspor t a t ion
Emphasis on Human Rights.

Questions regarding the

appropriateness and effectiveness of military strategies
regarding foreign policy were raised toward the end of the
Kissinger-Ford era, but especially during the Carter
Administration. 132

The carter administration directed more

attention, skilled officials, and aid to the Caribbean than
previous adminstrations had1 and developed the concept that
the United States should be willing to tolerate a degree of
ideological pluralism in the region. 133 The idea was advanced that it was to the U.S. advantage to avoid military
strategies, stressing instead human rights.

"Although

applied with some inconsistency, the advocacy of human rights
regained for the United States some of the respect among
centrist and democratic forces which had been lost in the
wake of its Vietnam and Chile experiences.• 134 The U.S.
emphasis on human rights (in spite of inconsistent policies)
promoted the development of a political center in the
Caribbean area while encouraging needed reforms. 135

For a

time it seemed these new policies promised the inauguration
of an era of friendly cooperative relations between
states. 136 However, during Carter's term in office there
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was a change in foreign policy.

Liberal policies were

replaced by more conservative ones.
Several international events reinforced the worries
of American decision-makers.
Afghanistan.

The Soviets had invaded

Iran had captured the American embassy, taking

American hostages.

And, in 1978, Cuba had sent troops to

Ethiopia which not only brought an end to the slow process
of normalization that had been developing in the United
States-Cuban relations, but reinforced U.S. anxieties about
Soviet-Cuban military intentions in the Third World. 137
The United States worried also about the presence of "MIG 23
attack aircraft which could conceivably carry nuclear
weapons" and about the presence of Soviet combat brigades in
Cuba. 138 Despite Soviet and Cuban reassurances, a further
decline in United States-Cuban relations occurred. 139
Then, in 1979 the Nicaraguan revolution added further
concerns for American foreign policy.
The view came to be stressed that "Communism was the
principal danger facing the world" and that "its spread
should be resisted." 14
Further, Cuba was regarded as a

°

surrogate of Moscow, responding to Soviet directions.

The

United States primarily relied on military measures to deal
with the perceived problem of Communist influence in the
Caribbean.

A view developed that Carter's earlier approach

had focused too much upon constraints and limits regarding
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American actions; instead, "there ought to be greater efforts
to project American power abroad in order to achieve a
tighter grip on global political developments." 141 In
fact, Communism ought to be resisted by the United States
"with all means at its disposal." 142 The renewed emphasis
on military strategy included the decision to set up a new
Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters in Key West, Florida,
and to expand the U.S. naval maneuvers in the Caribbean. 143
American warships were seen more frequently in the area,
participating in shows of force like "Operation Solid Shield
80;" this exercise occurred in May 1980, involving more than
20,000 men and 42 naval vessels. 144
Conservative Comeback
When President Reagan took off ice in 1981 he brought
with him "a deeply ingrained Cold War perspective of
inter-American relations." 145 This is particularly evident
in his view of Nicaragua.

Carter policy had initially seemed

to pursue policies aimed at cooperation rather than confrontation .146

However, the Reagan Administration would bring

an end to this approach.

The Sandinista movement in

Nicaragua was regarded as a Cuban inspired revolution.

In

fact, with the Sandinista success Nicaragua was regarded by
many in the Administration as "lost;" El Salvador and
Guatemala were viewed as "endangered;" Mexico was
"threatened;" and ultimately the United States--as "the last
147
domino"--would also be endangerea.
This concern for
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security from Cuban inspired revolutions affected the
perceptions of the United States regarding the Caribbean
Basin area.

It is, in fact, significant that the Reagan

Administraiton "drew no distinction between the Caribbean and
Central America," but referred to the area by a newer
concept, the Caribbean Basin. 148

Some analysts have argued

the small areas of this region really have little in common
beyond their close proximity to the United States "but were
forced together by the administration's determination to
reassert U.S. hegemony in the area and expunge Cuban
influence for good." 149
As a result of its concern over Cuban initiatives the
United States developed several poliicies to restrain Cuban
influence, including anti-Cuban broadcasts, and economic and
diplomatic efforts to reward or punish Caribbean states which
seemed too socialist or reformist1 but the United States
continued to rely on military policies also.
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CHAPTER III

GRENADA AND U.S. POLICIES
The Reagan Administration's concerns regarding the
spread of communism are demonstrated by the Administration's
reactions to events in Grenada.

Policymakers in the United

States regarded the new developments in the Grenadian
political situation as threatening, as providing an area from
which growing commuunist influence could spread to other
areas in the Caribbean Basin.

The U.S. policymakers

responded to this situation by consciously designing options
to signal U.S. concern and U.S. determination to halt any
further communist developments.

Specific military strategies

were designed to influence and coerce Grenada into altering
its state behavior so that it would be regarded as more
acceptable by the United States.

When influence strategies

failed to alter Grenada's state behavior, the United States
resorted to direct intervention.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
Grenada, having been discovered by Spain and ruled by
1
Britain for two hundred years, became independent in 1974.
Eric M. Gairy served as Prime Minister in a government that
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had American and British support.
many problems at this time.

However, Grenada faced

In 1975 Grenada was one of the

poorer countries in the Western Hemisphere, having a per
capita income of U.S. $390.

Further, the economy was not

well balanced, being dependent on export products of bananas,
cocoa, and spices.

Even more problems developed during the

Gairy administration.

Agriculture for local consumption

slumped to the degree that Grenada had to begin importing
most of its food, and unemployment increased (estimates range
from 20% to a rate of 50% of unemployment).

Tourism

declined; the balance of payments deficit increased; and
political tensions on the island increased.
On March 13, 1979, Gairy's government was overthrown by
an almost bloodless coup.

The leader of the coup was Maurice

Bishop, and his party was called the New Jewel Movement.
Shortly after the coup, Bishop declared a socialist
democratic and nationalist program of reform.

Bishop's

program included upgrading education, increasing food
production for local consumption, encouraging limited
tourism, reform of the bureaucracy, and the building of a new
airport.

However, Bishop and his new program--with its

stress on socialist reform--seemed communist.

This communist

involvement seemed further evidenced when Bishop invited
•'

Cuban military advisors to Grenada.

He also increasingly

utilized Marxian socialist terms such as "people's militia."

.._
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The new Grenadian government faced opposition from other
pro-American governments in the Caribbean.

They reacted with

hostility to the new government, with the premier of St.
Vincent going so far as to ask Britain to send troops to
overthrow the new government. 2
However, even within Grenada there was controversy
regarding Bishop. 3

There were factions--those who favored

a broadly social democratic emphasis and those who were
committed to Marxism and "the eventual socialist transformation of society."

To the latter group, it did not

appear that Bishop was moving fast enough toward Marxism-especially since Bishop appealed to both capitalist and
socialist countries for aid.

At issue also was the

increasingly autocratic style of Bishop's leadership.
As a result of political dissension within the New
Jewel Movement, Bishop was placed under house arrest on
October 13, 1983.

Protests grew regarding Bishop's arrest

and after a large demonstration on October 19, he was
temporarily freed.

However, he was later executed on the

same day.
In reaction to this act, the United States took strong
military action.

However, the Reagan Administration's

opposition to the revolutionary regime in Grenada had long
been evident. 4
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U.S. POLICY RESPONSES
Viewing the new Bishop government with alarm, U.S.
policymakers attempted to communicate U.S. displeasure with
Grenada's socialistic measures.

For example, the American

ambassador Frank Ortiz informed Bishop that the United States
would "view with displeasure any tendency on the part of
Grenada to develop closer ties with Cuba." 5 As noted,
while Bishop did make some accomodating moves toward the
United States (such as requesting U.S. aid) the Grenadian
government continued along its socialist path.
The U.S. policymakers apparently decided that U.S.
intentions needed to be signaled more strongly to Grenada.
Naval exercises were chosen as a way of communicating to
Grenada that the United States was serious in its opposition
to Grenadian policies, and that the United States expected a
different kind of state behavior from Grenada.
In August 1981 the United States conducted a large NATO
execise in the Caribbean.

Analysts have suggested the
purpose of the exercise was to "frighten Grenada.• 6 This
naval exercise was therefore conducted in a "noisy" manner,
attracting much publicity--presumably to alter further the
state behavior of Nicaragua. 7 In fact, these exercises
could have seemed very frightening to Grenada for they had
very suggestive parallels to that country.

One of the NATO

military exercises included a simulated attack upon the
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island of Vieques (located off the coast of Puerto Rico).
"The objective was to take power in a fictitious country
called 'Amber and the Amberines' (unavoidably suggestive of
Grenada and the Grenadines, especially since there was a
district called Amber in Grenada) until an election could be
called and a pro-u.s. government installed.• 8
In order to evaluate the utility of U.S. military
strategies, it is necessary to consider whether this military
signal was clear to the officials of the Grenadian government.

It could be presumed the signals were understandable

to the officials in Grenada, as well as to other observors.
Some evidence for this viewpoint exists in the fact that
debate in the later U.N. General Assembly, debate regarding
the eventual U.S. invasion of Grenada, referred to the fact
that "the intervention had been planned by the U.S. for a
number of years." 9 It could also be argued that these
exercises should have been understandable to the Grenadians
due to suggestive parallels between Grenada and the mock
invasion plans.
However, no matter how carefully devised, communicating
intentions by military strategies presents certain problems.
For example, even if a nation communicates its intentions
correctly, there is no guarantee that a nation's communication will be received correctly.

And, regarding the nature

of a communicated threat, the threatened action may not have
been

credible~

or Grenada may have just chosen to ignore the

71
threat.

Furthermore, the assumption that a threat will alter

behavior becomes questionable when the decision-makers
consider whether they would back down under similar action by
an opponent. 10
At any rate, this signaled threat did not have the
desired effect upon Grenada, as Grenada continued to develop
closer ties to the Cubans.

And, another U.S. Atlantic fleet

maneuver which was conducted in May 1982 also failed to alter
Grenadian policies.
Yet, the United States continued to pressure Grenada.
In March of 1983, Reagan claimed "the island was housing
Cuban and Soviet naval bases and other sophisticated military
installations,• with photographs and comments released which
allegedly illustrated military buildup and the military
aspects of Grenada's new airport. 11 During this televised
speech Reagan emphasized the strategic nature of the
Caribbean Basin:
The Caribbean is a very important passageway for
our international commerce and military lines of
communication. More than half of all American
oil imports now pass through the Caribbean. The
rapid build-up of Grenada's military potential
is unrelated to any conceivable threat to this
island country of under 110,000 people, and
totally at odds with the pattern of other eastern
Caribbean States, most of which are unarmed.
The Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada, in
short, can only been seen as power projection into
the region, and it is in this important economic and
strategic area that we are trying to help the
governments of El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras and
others in their struggles for democracy against 12
guerrillas supported through Cuba and Nicaragua.
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On the same day of Reagan's speech, the United States
attempted to physically demonstrate the verbalized concerns.

Another naval exercise began in the Caribbean.

It was a

month long exercise, involving 77 U.S. and allied
warships. 13
However, the Grenadian government still refused to be
intimidated.

In fact, Bishop's government in Grenada

attacked Reagan's statement, as an "open declaration of war"
and placed its military on alert. 14
Reagan continued to make more statements regarding the
danger of communism in Grenada.

"These statements apparently
were intended as warnings to Grenada." 15 For example, on

April 27th, Reagan addressed a joint session of Congress, and
again stressed the importance of Grenada.

Specifically, he

refered to a recent incident involving Libyan cargo planes.
They had been heading for Nicaragua--with a disguised shipment of weapons aboard--and were detained by authorities in
Brazil during a refueling stop.

Reagan emphasized the

strategic location of Grenada by stating:

"If that airfield

on Grenada had been completed, those planes could have
refueled there and completed their journey." 16
There is some indication that these threats and naval
maneuvers may have altered the behavior of Grenada at this
point.

In June 1983 Maurice Bishop decided to visit the
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United States.

"In hindsight, Bishop's visit may have been a

desperate attempt to head off growing extremist opposition,

and he may genuinely have wished to reduce his Cuban ties or
at least balance them with some links to the United
States. 1117
However, as previously noted, by October 13, Bishop was
arrested by more extremist colleagues.

Although he was later

freed on October 19, he was executed later on the same day.
At this point the United States responded with the
strong military action of actually invading Grenada.

Six

thousand U.S. troops were sent to the island, accompanied by
300 other soldiers from seven Caribbean states.
The U.S. government employed several justifications for
this action.

On October 19 several members of the Eastern

Caribbean States had met, and six nations requested outside
help from the United States.

Reagan also justified the

invasion as necessary to protect American citizens
(especially 800 medical students), as necessary to restore
order and democratic rule, and as necessary to eliminate
Cuban influence. 18
After the U.S. invasion it is noteworthy that a 1984
election was held in Grenada.

Hebert A. Blaize, a member of

the centrist coalition became the new prime minister.
EVALUATION OF U.S. STRATEGIES
It is possible to evaluate this military action from a
variety of perspectives.

In the short term, it can be argued
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that the United States prevented the potential loss of
American lives in Grenada or that Cuban-Soviet influence was
thwarted.

There is evidence to indicate that U.S. actions in

Grenada did affect the Cubans.

Events in Grenada suggested

the Cubans could offer no real military assistance to a
socialist government if the United States was willing to use
direct military force:
Prior to Grenada there was much speculation as to
whether Cuba would follow the precedents of Angola
and Ethiopia by sending troops to aid Nicaragua in
the event of a conflict between Nicaragua and its
neighbors. After Grenada, there was no such
speculation. The Cubans themselves acknowledged
their inability to act militarily in Central
America in the face of the £~erwhelming military
might of the United States.
In the long run, however, there are aspects of this
policy that cause concern.

As in earlier cases of

intervention, forceful U.S. actions have contributed to a
negative perception regarding United States intentions and
actions.

For example, some speakers debating this issue at

the General Assembly of the United Nations referred to the
United States as "imperalist" and interested in continuing
"colonist domination." 20 The invasion of Grenada was
criticized also as being unlawful.

The United States argued

that it had a right to intervene based on a treaty clause of
the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States COECS), but
other countries pointed out that the OECS document called for
a majority of countries to request outside help, not merely
the request from six.

And, voting in the U.N. General
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Assembly, by a vote of 108 to 9, the majority of nations
approved a statement which "deeply deplored the armed

intervention in Grenada as constituting a 'flagrant violation
of international law and of the independence, sovereignty and
teritory of that State.•• 21 The majority of the membership
of the OAS also censured the United States for its actions in
Grenada, with the Venezuelan government being particularly
outspoken in its criticism. 22 In fact, a number of traditional allies to the United States opposed the invasion,
including France, Canada, Mexico, and Britain. 23 The
British emphasized the fact that the invasion of Grenada
would lessen the West's claim to moral superiority in international relations when comparisons would be made comparing
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the U.S. invasion of
Grenada. 24 Finally, although ultimately vetoed by the
United States, a Security Council resolution deploring U.S.
aggression initially received eleven votes to one with two
abstentions--this voting can be viewed as "giving some
measure of the scale of international opposition to the U.S.
action.• 25
Another problem with the reliance upon military
strategies is that such policies may limit other foreign
policy options.

It could be argued that the reliance upon

military strategies has short-circuited other policies such
as negotiation or more flexible, alternative responses--such
as a solution which might involve power-sharing between
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capitalistic and socialistic forces within a country.
Considering the problems connected with military strategies,
the decision that force was necessary needs to be
reevaluated.

One method of evaluation is to consider what

would have happened if no force had been used.

Such an

analysis is admittedly suggestive and speculative.

However,

an examination of several other states in the Caribbean
suggests that socialist experiments need not lead to full
membership in the Soviet bloc.
As noted earlier, several states in the 1970s developed
socialistic policies which alarmed the United States.

The

United States did not use military strategies to deal with
these areas, yet these states have not become threats to the
region or to the United States.

For example, it was stated

that in 1973 Guyana appeared to have a very radical
government.

However, President Forbes Burnham, who had

dominated Guyanese political life since independence in 1966,
died in 1985 and was succeeded by Desmond Hoyte who has taken
some steps to improve the country's relations with the United
States.

In Jamaica, it had seemed alarming when Michael

Manley had come to off ice in 1972 and when Jamaica preceded
to embark upon socialistic reforms.

However, in 1980 Manley

lost his reelection bid, and Manley's socialist experiment
seems to have been stopped. 26

In 1979 Dominica and st.

Lucia also acquired new governments which stressed reform and
socialistic measures.

However, an unusually severe hurricane

------,
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in October of 1979 caused such physical devastation in
Dominica that more conservative parties were returned to
power to try to cope with the damage.

In St. Lucia, the

reformist government never really became effective due to
"almost incessant feuding.• 27 These examples would suggest
that an analysis of "splashing socialist dominoes" in the
Caribbean has not been accurate.
Further, the use of U.S. force in Grenada can not only
be regarded as a specific response to a particular situation,
but can also be regarded as a larger U.S. policy position in
the caribbean--a warning of what could happen to other "bad
neighbors." 28 It would seem that a group of nations
friendly to the United States (good neighbors) could invite
the United States to invade a neighbor they see as threatening Ca bad neighbor).

Such a request could seem quite

appealing since the requesting nation would need to contribute only token military forces to the invading force.
Instead, direct U.S. force, "either through airpower,seapower, tactical support, or troops," could be sent into the
territory of the "bad neighbor."

Further, the various

regional alliances could provide a ready-made framework for
such a request from the Caribbean states.
The Reagan Administration's posture toward Grenada has
had clear implications for other nations in the region.

In

particular, the policy has clear implications for the
situation in Nicaragua.

The U.S. occupation of Grenada has
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demonstrated the willingness of the United States to resort
to pure physical force when other influence methods have not
achieved the desired goals of the policymakers.

Even though

Grenada is a small island one analyst argued the U.S.
occupation of Grenada "added bite to the Administration's
threatening posture toward Nicaragua." 29
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CHAPTER IV
NICARAGUA
During the Reagan Adminstration, Nicaragua, as well as
Grenada, have come to represent the Communist threat to the
rest of the Caribbean Basin and to America.

This fear has
been reinforced by the Kissinger Commission's report. 1
This bipartisan commission, appointed by the Reagan
Administration, asserted that the revolutionary movement
opposing the Somoza regime had been seized by self-proclaimed
Marxist-Leninists.

The Commission further noted that the

Sandinista leadership continued to pattern the Nicaraguan
government after the Cuban regime.

For example, the new

government was characterized by mass organizations under its
political direction, while an internal security system
existed--apparently to supervise the entire population.

The

Commission also pointed to the massive military establishment
which seemed too large for just the needs of Nicaragua.
This view of Nicaragua as a threat, as a possible
exporting vehicle for Soviet-Cuban communism, has intensified
U.S. involvement in the Caribbean Basin.

Further, the United

States has continued to rely primarily on military policies
in attempting to alter the state behavior of Nicaragua.

An

in-depth examination of these, as well as past U.S. policies,
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is necessary for an effective analysis concerning the utility
of U.S. military strategies in the Caribbean Basin.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
AND EARLY U.S. RESPONSES
Early Foreign Intervention
Nicaragua has a long history of intervention.

The

country was under Spanish influence since 1523, although the
Carib Indians along the Miskito Coast (along the Atlantic)
remained under British control until the 1800s.
The history of U.S. intervention can be traced back to
the 1830s.

At this time U.S. businessmen started formulating

plans to construct an interoceanic canal across Nicaragua.
This early canal proposal ultimately failed, but the United
States continued to show interest in this country.
U.S. policies in regard to Nicaragua became more
militant.

In 1854 the U.S. Foreign Ministry in San Juan del

Norte had been attacked by Nicaraguans after an anti-United
States protest.

The United States responded by having the

U.S. warship Cayne fire upon that Nicaraguan port.

The

United States also militarily intervened in Nicaragua other
times in the 1850s: 1850, 1853, 1854 and 1857. 2
In 1855 an American adventurer, William Walker,
declared himself president of Nicaragua.

The investor

Cornelius Vanderbilt eventually forced Walker to surrender to
the U.S. Navy.

Although Walker was a private citizen, he was
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viewed by many as •a symbol of U.S. expansionism.• 3

This

impression was reinforced by Walker's subsequent actions.
Seeking to once again gain influence, Walker conducted two
more military excursions in the Central American region,
although he was finally captured and killed by the Hondurans.
The United States did not interfere in Nicaragua again
until 1910 when the Taft Admnistration actively aided a
Conservative Party revolt against President Zelaya whose
nationalism threatened the perceived interests of the United
States.

The U.S. Marines remained intermittently in
Nicaragua throughout the following twenty years. 4
"Although the numbers of marines were small, they were able
to effectively control national policy.• 5 An example of
this control was the link between the military and economic
policies. Bolstered by the presence of the Marines, U.S.
financial advisers administered the nation's financial
policies--even to the extent of creating the c6rdoba as
the national currency.

During this early period, United

States power was at first maintained by its own military
presence.

However, over time a privileged elite developed

who profited from the occupation, thereby lending its support
to U.S. preferences. 6
The U.S. forces left Nicaragua in 1925 but returned the
next year to enforce a political settlement; this event led
the United states into confrontation with Augusto Cesar
Sandino.

Sandino opposed the American presence and organized
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a peasant army to oppose U.S. forces.

•The war proved

indecisive on the ground and unpopular in the United States,
forcing American withdrawal in 1933.• 7 The principal
legacy of the U.S. occupation was the National Guard which
was a military force trained by U.S. Marines and placed under
the pro-u.s. officer Anastasio Somoza Garcia, with the hope
that the guard would "keep peace and protect U.S. interests"
in the area. 8
Sandino remained an important political force in
Nicaragua, until he was murdered in 1934 at the order of the
commander of the American trained National Guard, Somoza. 9
In 1936 Somoza pressured his main competition Sacasa into
resignation, assuming direct control of Nicaraguan affairs.
However, the United States still desired to influence
events in Nicaragua.

Therefore, the United States maintained

close relations with the Somoza regime.

The degree to which

the United States felt secure about its influence over the
American-educated and supported leader is indicated by
Franklin Roosevelt's famous phrase (referring to Somoza) that
he was:

"Our son of a bitch."lO

Somoza continued to consolidate economic and political
power, establishing a military dictatorship.
in 1956 and died from his wounds.

Somoza was shot

However, his sons--first

Luis Somoza Debayle, and then the younger son Anastasio
Samoza Debayle--continued the Somoza dictatorship.
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The Seeds of Revolution 11
The Somoza regime was increasingly beset by problems.
Although the insurrection leading to the downfall of
Anastasio Somoza Debayle was initiated by events in the
1970s, it was more fundamentally caused by inequities that
had developed during previous decades.

These problems

included export dependence on a sometimes fluctuating world
market, peasants who had been forced off land that was
desired for export production, and severe problems of
unemployment.

The severity of the Nicaraguan situation can

be indicated by the fact that during the last twenty years of
Somozan rule the GNP increased, but the rate of childhood
malnutrition grew.

Clearly benefits were not evenly

distributed; military force was utilized to support the
status quo.
The situation which precipitated a crisis for the
Somozan rule was a massive earthquake which destroyed much of
Managua in 1972.

Thousands of Nicaraguans suffered facing

even more hardships as the Somozan government siphoned off
millions of dollars that had been intended for international
relief.

Resentment over this situation fueled desires for

reform.
The Somozan regime increasingly became opposed.

More

moderate groups included broad alliances of business, labor
and political organizations which opposed the Somoza dictatorship.

These groups fought Somoza with declarations,
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petitions, and negotiations--as well as with demonstrations
and strikes.

The radical opposition was led by the

Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional (FSLN).

This group sought

major social and economic change:
The Sandinistas shared the Marxism that was common
in the anti-regime student-political milieu from which
most FSLN leaders came, and they were inspired by the
young Cuban revolution. Some were connected
with the Moscow-oriented Nicaraguan Socialist Party
(Partido Socialista Nicaraguense-PSN). However,
Sandinista ideology was and remains ill-defined,
heterodox and pragmatic. From the beginning,
party programs spoke of preserving a place for
private enterprise within a planned economy.
Catholic radicals gained positions of prominence
among the leadership, a situation u~~maginable in
an orthodox Marxist-Leninist party.
Nevertheless, after years of U.S. influence in the
Somoza regime the United States viewed the new situation with
alarm.

In particular, the Carter Administraiton stuggled to

find appropriate policies to deal with this situation.
Carter's Response
Under the Carter Administration the United States had
struggled to maintain influence in Nicaragua.

Yet Carter had

professed interest in promoting human rights and exploring
peaceful strategies.

In fact, this policy seemed to have

been pursued in 1977 when military aid to the Somozan regime
was halted in response to the alleged brutality and
repression of the National Guard.
However, the carter Administration still relied on
military pressure to gain U.S. desired goals.

For example,

it has been reported that during the rule of Somoza, Carter
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had signed a presidential "finding" that •covert action by
the CIA was needed in Nicaragua" for the •national security"

of the United States. 13

And, by mid-1978 the United States

provided $12 million in economic aid to Somoza, claiming that
the regime no longer had severe human right violations. 14
"By appearing to re-endorse Somoza, Carter inadvertently
undermined the moderate opposition and increased support for
the FSLN."lS
After the popular uprising of September 1978 the Carter
Administration appeared to accept that the Somozan regime
could not be maintained.

At that point, the United States

initiated a series of actions designed to replace Somoza and
to develop a working relationship with moderate reform
elements inside Nicaragua.

When the carter Administration

failed at these attempts, the U.S. suggested an O.A.S.
peacekeeping force for Nicaragua.

This also failed, being

viewed in fact as •a facade for armed intervention to
forestall a Sandinista victory" and to maintain the key
elements of the Somoza regime "without the dictator." 16
The Sandinistas continued to solidify their control in
Nicaragua.

And on July 19, 1979, the few remaining members

of the Somoza regime were evacuated from the country.

The

initial composition of the new government reflected a variety
of political forces.
The Carter Administration attempted to develop a
positive relationship with the new government.

United States
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negotiators met with Nicaraguan officials and aid was
extended to Nicaragua.

For example, during Carter's last

year in off ice several million dollars of loans were made to
Nicaragua and Nicaragua renegotiated a debt of almost $490
million. 17
However, tensions existed between Nicaragua and the
United States.

The American policymakers were concerned with

the growing exclusion of moderates, with the increasingly
strident Marxist-Leninist statements, by the eventual emergence of Daniel Ortega as the Nicaraguan leader, and by the
growing fear that the Sandinistas intended to support similar
revolutions throughout the Caribbean area.
These tensions would be exacerbated during the Reagan
Administration.

In fact, Ronald Reagan's election to the

presidency in November 1980 marked a shift in U.S.-Nicaraguan
relations. 18
REAGAN AND THE ATTEMPTED COMMUNIST ROLLBACK
Early Reagan Policies
Ronald Reagan "had run on a party platform that, in
thinly veiled language, urged support for efforts to depose
the Sandinistas;• yet, the new Reagan administration did not
immediately reorient U.S. policies. 19 For example,
Ambassador Pezzullo who had been closely associated with
Carter's philosophy, kept his office until 1981. 20
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Early Use of Threats.

However, by 1981 the U.S.

interactions with Nicaragua were becoming more menacing.
Concerned about reports that the Nicaraguans were supplying
arms to El Salvadoran rebels, the United States demanded that
such aid be halted.

In spite of reports that Nicaragua was

indeed halting or substantially reducing such shipments, the
U.S. Government stated in April 1981 that no more financial
aid--or wheat sales--would be continued. 21
In July 1981 the Sandinistas announced more socialistic
measures, including a decree expropriating thirteen major
private firms; the United States responded to this situation
by initiating a series of diplomatic talks, with Assistant
Secretary of State Thomas Enders representing the United
States.

In retrospect, U.S. interactions with Nicaragua at

this time can be viewed as involving military threats to the
Sandinista government, even though such threats were
"d'isgu1se
· d as d'ip 1 oma t'ic in1t1at1ves.
· · ·
·
" 22

For examp 1 e,

under Enders sponsorship, the United States implied that if
the Sandinistas were more "cooperative,• the United States
would sign a nonaggression pact with Nicaragua and that the
United States would disband "the camps in Florida where
Nicaraguan exiles were training to overthrow the Sandinista
government." 23 The obvious threat was that the United
States would continue such activities if the Sandinistas
proved uncooperative.

Seemingly Enders was willing to use

military policies to influence the situation.

However,
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"Enders sought to use the immense U.S. power as a stick to
shape negotiations rather than as a club to drive the
Sandinistas and FMLN into oblivion." 24 These threats were
not "well-received," with Nicaragua seemingly determined not
to alter its state behavior as a result of U.S. threats. 25
In November of 1981, Alexander Haig, then Secretary of
State, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Haig continued to present a threatening posture by refusing
to dismiss the possibility of a military blockade of
Nicaragua or assistance to the Nicaraguan exiles trying to
overthrow the Sandinista government.
Attempts at Credibility.

In November 1981, backing

previous threats with credible actions, the National Security
Council CNSC) decided to implement a larger scale program to
deal with opposition to U.S. policies in the Caribbean Basin.
The program included:
••• subversive operations inside Nicaragua, support
for paramilitary operations against the Sandinistas
from the outside, economic pressures, military
threats, contingency planning for military intervention, increased intelligence activity, propaganda
efforts, more military aid to El Salvador and more
pressures on Cuba, and jo~gt planning with America's
friends in Latin America.
In November the United States also attempted to
reinforce its credibility by conducting large naval exercises
in the Caribbean CREADEX-1) "as a warning to Nicaragua." 27
These exercises involved other NATO countries, presumably
sending an even more credible threat to Nicaragua.
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Debate Regarding U.S. Policies.

This reliance upon

military strategies was alarming to many.

In the summer of

1982, during CIA briefings, Congress was informed that
U.S.-supported contras had destroyed two major bridges inside
Nicaragua in March, and that the "supposedly limited commando
forces had grown to 15,000 soldiers" who were preparing to
relocate some of their camps from Honduras to Northern
Nicaragua.

The legality of these activities was questioned

and the fear of a war between Honduras and Nicaragua--started
by the CIA and the contras--grew.

In response to these

concerns (August, 1982) Congress amended the secret
intelligence bill, setting clear limits on U.S. covert
operations in the Caribbean Basin. 28
Yet, American policy was still not clearly defined
regarding the reliance upon military strategies. 29 In
December 1982 Congress had •publically approved• the Boland
Amendment which specifically prevented the Reagan
Administration from financing the contras for the purpose of
overthrowing Nicaragua's government.

However, various policy

makers insisted that enough force was needed to achieve
•symmetry".

To these officials symmetry meant that the

contras, with U.S. backup would respond to any Nicaraguan
military action with a similar strategy of their own.

The

concept of symmetry permitted the Administration to argue,
however, that it was only acting toward Nicaragua as
Nicaragua acted toward others, even though the contras Reagan
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funded in Nicaragua declared openly their goal was to
overthrow the Sandinistas. 30
Certain U.S. policy makers, then, favored using
military strategies; however, just as they had to contend
with a reluctant Congress, so they had to contend with a
regional group which sponsored negotiation rather than
confrontation.

In January 1982, a group of countries--

Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama--met on the Panamanian
island of Contadora.

These countries became known as the

Contadora group, and seemed to promise an alternative to U.S.
military solutions.

This complicated the use of military

policies by the United States.

The Administration needed to

appear as if it were responsive to negotiations if it hoped
to stay on good terms with Congress.

The tension between

choosing between military strategies or negotiations is
evidenced by the fact that Reagan was careful to appeal to
both factions.

When President Reagan addressed a joint

session of Congress on April 27th, he announced that "we will
support dialogue and negotiations--both among the countries
of the region and within each country." 31 Yet, Reagan also
called for increased economic and military aid "to bolster
humane democratic systems" and respond to "the military
challenge from Cuba and Nicaragua." 32
By the spring of 1983 there was more debate as to the
degree of military influence that ought to be exerted.
was becoming clear that halting guerilla activity in

It
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El Salvador would not be an easy task.

Further, Nicaragua

continued to establish closer ties with the Cubans and
Soviets.

Administration officials became even more concerned

that Nicaragua could serve as an attractive model for other
Marxist/socialist revolutions, as well as offering military
support to such groups.

"By May there was plainly an intense

debate within the Administration over whether it should go
beyond its existing program of 'covert' aid to antiSandinista guerillas, to threaten Nicaragua more directly
with the application of direct U.S. power.• 33
Continued Threats and Military Strategies.

The

increasing U.S. reliance upon military strategies is clearly
evidenced by U.S. activities which began in early July 1983.
At this time large-scale joint military maneuvers between the
United States and Honduras were announced.
Although the Reagan Administration initially presented
these joint military maneuvers, called the Big Pine II
maneuvers, as routine--these military exercises seemed
clearly designed to influence the Sandinistas to alter the
state behavior of Nicaragua.
naval activities.

Part of the exercise included

These exercises included a naval

show-of-force by the United States.

However, U.S. Forces

were so great that it could be argued these forces were meant
to do more than just display power, they were meant as a
threat.

For example, two separate naval forces, including

U.S. warships and aircraft carriers, were sent by the United
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States and were assigned to each side of the Nicaraguan
coast.

The threatening nature of this U.S. action is clear

when one considers that:
The destructive force represented by the guns
and planes carried on these two armadas is
phenomenal: It should be noted that at no
time did the United States deploy as much
naval-based fire power in Southeast Asia
thro~~hout the entire course of the Vietnam
war.
Furthermore, the nature of the exercises was threatening.
During these exercises the Navy practiced blockade
techniques. 35 And, Marines stated a practice amphibious
landing on the nearby coast of Honduras. 36

Aside from the

naval activities, American personnel were also stationed in
several neighboring countries near Nicaragua.

The

threatening nature of the American troops can be evidenced by
their close geographical proximity to Nicaragua.

For

example, one group was sent to a nnarrow strip of land near
the Gulf of Fonesca that separates El Salvador and
Nicaragua.n 37 Another naval crew was ordered to dig wells
in Guanacaste--a northern Costa Rican province which is just
na few minutes driven from the Nicaraguan border. 38
These exercises, then, involved a display of U.S. force
which was an attempt to communicate a threat, thereby
influencing Sandinista behavior.
by the U.S. actions themselves.

The threat was communicated
Aside from the nature and

location of these military maneuvers, the scope of these
exercises were larger than earlier maneuvers--presumably,
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this could communicate a stronger message to the Sandinistas.
And, these exercises were designed to last months, rather
than just the days or weeks of previous U.S. maneuvers. 39
In fact, so many thousands of Americans were involved that
the Big Pine II exercises could be considered as

"nothing

less than a temporary stationing of U.S. armed forces in the
Isthmus." 40
The United States did not rely entirely on its actions
to communicate its displeasure to Nicaragua.
ing statements were made.

More threaten-

Top Reagan Administration

officials publicly stated that unless Cuba halted shipments
to Nicaragua, President Reagan "had not ruled out establishing a military quarantine around Nicaragua." 41 Other
"unnamed Administration officials" repeated strong statements
to the popular press, such as the statement found in a Time
magazine:

"We want to persuade the bad guys in Nicaragua and

Cuba that we are positioned to block, invade, or interdict if
they cross a particular threshold." 42 Furthermore, during
this period of time, U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick talked
"openly about the possibility of interdiction,• and when
asked if the naval maneuvers were showing the Sandinistas
that the U.S. could blockade Nicaragua, Kirkpatrick replied,
"Maybe. Maybe we'll remind them of that." 43
There is some evidence that U.S. Forces served more of
a purpose than "gunboat diplomacy• and coercion, that they
actually served a military function, thus representing an
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escalation of force.

The contras were supported by the

United States and therefore benefited from the U.S. troop
presence.

In fact, U.S. troops •acted as a shield to protect

contra forays across the Nicaraguan border;• and it can be
argued that "it was no accident that upsurges in contra acton
did occur• during these exercises. 44
By the end of 1983 it was clear that the United States
had continually increased its reliance upon military
strategies.

Big Pine II represented the largest maneuvers

conducted by the United States, larger even than naval
displays in Vietnam during that war.

Known United States

armed forces in the area had increased from 500 in December
1981 to about 15,000 in late 1983. 45 Originally, President
Reagan approved a $19.5 million program of funding covert
activities in Central America, for the stated purpose of
"stopping Nicaraguan arms shipments to Salvadoran and other
Central American rebels.• 46 Budgetary arrangements for
funding subsequent operations have not been entirely clear.
However, a press report has referred to the United States
Congress as having approved about $20 million for 1983, and
in November 1983, legislation was adopted that no more than
$24,000,000 was to be allocated for military or paramilitary
.
.
.
47
ac t ions
in
Nicaragua.

Evaluation of Early Policies
The United States has clearly relied upon military
strategies in dealing with Nicaragua.

President Carter made
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some attempts to shift the focus of U.S. policies; but the
Carter Administration did not maintain a consistent approach
to Nicaragua, relying intermittently upon military strategies
when they seemed

needed.

When Nicaragua did not appear to

be responding to veiled military threats (such as the ones
referred to in 1981 regarding the camps in Florida), the
United States used more direct threats, and attempted to
support these verbal statements by concrete actions to make
these threats even more credible.

During the Reagan

Administration United States policymakers resorted even more
to military strategies.

Such heavy reliance upon military

policies has lead one analyst to write that the United States
has used military options as a substitute for state policy,
with diplomacy and politics being replaced by threats and
military escalation. 48
camouflaged Tactics and Information.

Since much

information regarding Nicaragua is classified, it is not an
easy task to evaluate U.S. military policies in Nicaragua.
Clearly it would often be a disadvantage to openly discuss
the underlying reasons of U.S. negotiation strategy--or to
state that a military maneuver was designed only as a bluff.
Furthermore, military policies have been of a covert nature.
Therefore, there are innumerable difficulties in
documenting such U.S. military involvement.

It is known that

the United States has provided military weapons to "friendly"
countries, countries which are willing to oppose Nicaragua.
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For example, in March 1982 the United States provided 10 Bell
UH-lH helicopters to Honduras.

These planes were provided at
no cost to Honduras under a special lease program. 49
American personnel were needed to provide training regarding
these helicopters.

However, the numbers of U.S. military

personnel have been hard to track.

By 1982 a Pentagon

spokesman stated that a number of U.S. military personnel had
trained the Hondurans in technical areas as "helicopter
maintenance and air base security," but he added the number
of U.S. personnel have changed "too frequently for us to keep
tabs," and a specific breakdown of the U.S. trainers and
their function was "unavailable." 50 Not only have there
not always been clear indications regarding the exact number
of Americans involved in suport of other country's military
policies, but there have not always been clear indications as
to the exact scope of these American personnel.

For example,

the Green Beret Special Forces were reportedly in Panama as
advisors.

However, in 1981 they were reported as having

actually been seen patroling the border between Panama and
El Salvador, dressed in camouflage and carrying M16s. 51
Another incident explains how the Administration has
attempted to avoid Congressional oversight and restrictions,
but also indicates the difficulty of accurately reporting
U.S. military involvement in the region.52

Normally, to

provide funds to build bases or provide military supplies to
a foreign government, the American government first must
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obtain the consent of Congress, "a consent which has been
increasingly difficult to achieve.•

Yet the United States

military constructed a base at Durzuna claiming it was needed
to conduct U.S. military exercises there.

When the exercises

were over, the military equipment that had been funded for
U.S. military maneuvers was simply left behind--for contra
use.

Since this money and equipment does not appear in any

category of U.S. security assistance to Honduras, it serves
to hide the true amount and proportion of military aid that
the public knows about.
Unwilling to appear as an aggressor and restrained by a
Congress which became increasingly hesitant to rely upon
military straegies, the United States policymakers encouraged
other countries sympathetic of the U.S. stance to aid the
contras.

In mid-1983 Israel was "persuaded" to supplement

U.S. military aid by sending weapons captured in Lebanon to
officials in the Honduran government--weapons that would be
distributed eventually to the contras. 53
Restricted Options. Since information regarding
U.S. military strategies has often been restricted and since
publicized satements have often been made for effect (as with
threats) a certain amount of speculation is involved in
analyzing U.S. policies.
However, it is clear that over a period of time,
U.S. policymakers who favored stronger U.S. actions gained
prominence within the Reagan Administration.

For example, in
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the early 1980s policy toward Nicaragua had largely been in
the hands of the State Department--specifically, under the
direction of Thomas Enders.

Enders came to develop strong

views regarding the Nicarguan situation; he has been reported
as finally viewing the situation there •as not warranting
direct U.S. military intervention.• 54 Rather, Enders
favored isolation and containment of the Nicaraguan
government, with emphasis on seeking a negotiated settlement. 55

However, Enders' approach was disputed by others,

especially by then National Security Advisor William P. Clark
and Jeane Kirkpatrick, then U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations. 56 Enders was eventually replaced by Langhorn
Motley whose early views reflected reliance upon military
57
.
s t ra t eg1es.
However, over a period of time, Motley
preferred policies which sought alternatives to military
force or threats.

In fact, Motley decided that "United

States military escalation created the opposite results that
it had set out to achieve.• 58
Still, the Reagan Administration did not appear to
fully explore policies other than military ones.
Specifically, it has been suggested that the Reagan
Administration "used diplomatic discussions as a fig leaf for
military escalation.• 59 For example, it has been suggested
that Nicaragua did experience political and economic
pressures due to the activities of the u.s.-supported
contras; and that by July 1982 the Sandinista regime did
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alter its behavior by relaxing media censorship and by
presenting new draft proposals to the Contadora countries;
these actions can be viewed as "conciliatory" gestures which
clearly signaled that it wanted "to reach accomodation with
the United States." 60

However, the Reagan Administration

has been criticized because it did not "test or explore the
Nicaraguan gambit," but instead continued to ask for more
61
.
f rom Nicaragua.
.
concessions

.
In f act, U.S. po l'lc1es

seemed to consist of tactics of "sanctions and pressure." 62
Just as the United States restricted its own domestic
policy options, it also did not fully explore Contadora
regional peacemaking efforts.

United States reluctance

regarding the Contadora proposals may have stemmed from U.S.
hesitation to participate in a rather unpredictable negotiation process. 63

A National Security document from the

time of these negotiations has been made public; it revealed
the United States had a deep mistrust of the Mexicans and
their approach to the region, which tacitly implied some
political particpation for the socialists in El Salvador and
. . t as in
.
.
64
th e San d ln1s
Nicaragua.
Risk v. Effective Policy.

There is some evidence

which suggests that U.S. military strategies did have an
impact on Nicaragua.

For example, by September 1983

Nicaragua "seemed more responsive to the negotiating efforts
presented by the Contadora groups." 65

The Sandinistas also

attempted to placate other states by removing several Cuban
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advisors, lightening their censorship of the press, and
making statements regarding the importance of a fair
electoral process. 66 To some it seemed that "gunboat
diplomacy" so concerned the Sandinistas that they decided to
radically change tactics." 67 • Specifically, the Big Pine
II exercises were considered by government officials to be an
effective communication of U.S. intentions, responsible for
the altered state behavior of Nicaragua. 68
The state behavior of the Soviet Union and Cuba also
altered.

Castro now offered to "work out a deal with

President Reagan to pull out all foreign military advisors
from Central America." 69 And, during a naval incident,
occuring within a week of the Big Pine II exercises,the
Soviets were "unusually restrained;" they "clearly shied away
from a confrontation with the u.s." 70 It was considered
that this Soviet caution may have been due to "the Reagan
Adminisration's evident disposition to use force to shore up
the American sphere of influence." 71
State behavior of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union
did alter; however, the evidence is suggestive rather than
conclusive regarding the cause for the changed behavior.

The

tentative nature of these findings is partially due to a
restricted amount of available information concerning the
subject.

The altered actions could have been influenced by

factors, other than coercion. For example, altered actions
could have been designed for Nicaraguan propaganda value,
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with the United States portrayed as an aggressive and
militaristic nation, as contrasted to Nicaragua, a nation
trying to present itself as reasonable, as interested in
negotiations.

Or, Nicaragua and Cuba may have been sincerely

seeking an accomodation with their neighbors.

For example,

now that the Sandinistas had gained political control they
may have desired to strengthen and solidify their programs
within Nicaragua rather than becoming IOOre involved with
regional reform movements.

The Soviet Union may not have

been affected by coercion either.

The Soviet Union may

simply have been preoccupied with internal matters, such as
the illness or succession of new leaders.

Or, the Soviet

Union may simply have restricted its policy voluntarily.
Involvement in both Afghanistan and the Caribbean (with the
Caribbean representing even more of a financial commitment
due to its distant geographical location) could have been
considered unwise from an economic viewpoint.
Regardless of the true reason for altered state
behavior, the Reagan Administration interpreted Nicaraguan,
Cuban and Soviet rections as an indication that U.S. military
strategies had been successful. 72 Rather than pursuing
unpredictable negotiations which possibly could accord
socialists some legitimacy, the United States viewed military
strategies as a more controllable approach to the region's
problems. 73 When Nicaraguan actions appeared "as a sign
they were buckling under" these strategies seemed successful;
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to many U.S. policymakers it became imperative for the United
States "to increse the pressure" on the Sandinistas even
more. 74
Even if the use of military force was successful in
altering the behavior of states as a consequence of the
Big Pine II exercises, it is still questionable whether the
United States ought to rely upon such strategies.

As pointed

out previously in the historical section of this paper,
United States influence and intervention has been resented.
There already exists •anti-Yankee" sentiment and recent U.S.
responses only strengthen such attitudes.

For example, in

mid-August of 1983, President Miguel de la Madrid (Mexico)
cautioned Prsident Reagan against aggravating existing
problems through U.S. 8 Shows of force." 75
Aside from such reactions, U.S. military policies
involve a certain amount of risk.

There is always the danger

of escalation, even the risk of war.

For example, within one

week of the Big Pine II naval maneuvers an incident occured
which could have led to an escalation of military forces.

In

this incident "a U.S. destroyer harassed a Soviet freighter
by demanding to be told its cargo and destination, then
shadowing it for the next forty miles until it turned into
Nicaraguan territorial waters to enter Corinto, the nation's
largest port.• 76
resolve of the

While this incident demonstrated the

U~ited

States it can also be considered as
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"brazen and reckless" and could have led to a situation as
serious as the confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union in the Cuban Missile Crisis. 77 During
this same period of time, former Vice-President Mondale
warned that escalation would occur:

" ••• under present

policies it is inevitable that American troops will be sent
to Central America ••• " 78
There was also the problem of planned operations
exceeding their original limits.

Reporters in Newsweek

magazine claimed, in fact, that operations along the
Nicaraguan-Honduran border "have escalated far beyond
Washington's original intentions." 79 The involvement of
the United States in the support of the contras has provided
a particular problem.

There was the question of how much

control the planners in Washington or the U.S. advisors in
the field actually had concerning the military force used by
the contras.

For example, in May 1983, one of the contras,

Pedro Pablo Ortiz Centeno who called himself "Commander
Suicide," went on a personal rampage. This illustrated but
one aspect of the difficulty involving the control of the
contra forces.

One analyst wrote that the forces backed by

Washington must be under tight control, "But the actions of
Suicide suggested they were under little or no contro1.• 80
Regardless of the possible negative impact of U.S.
military strategies in the Caribbean Basin and regardless of
the actual risk involved in these actions, the United States
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continued to employ military strategies to try to influence
and coerce Nicaragua into state behavior that would be more
acceptable to the United States.
REAGAN AND THE MINING OF THE NICARAGUAN HARBORS
By 1984, there was no improvement between the United
States and Nicaraguan relations.

While the Sandinistas had

made certain negotiating suggestions previously, by 1984 "the
Sandinistas had taken about as many conciliatory steps as
they were likely to be willing to do." 81 They also verbally indicated their belief that the Reagan Administration
would not be satisfied until they gave up so many principles
"that they stopped being Sandinistas." 82
Even while continuing its participation in the
negotiating process, the United States continued to rely upon
military policies.

This time a stronger policy was devised,

designed to presumably send an even stronger message to
Nicaragua.

By November 1984, the Reagan Administration

focused less on the shipment of arms by Nicaragua to other
countries (possibly because there was little proof regarding
these activities).

Increasingly, the Administration

spokesmen began insisting that "major changes in the basic
nature of the Sandinista regime itself" occur. 83

And, the

United States became involved in the laying of mines in or
close to various Nicaraguan ports.

----------.,

107

The Course of Events
Official information regarding these incidents has not
been clearly documented.

However, U.S. involvement in the
mining incidents seems well substantiated. 84 U.S. press
reports quote U.S. administration officials as saying that
mines were constructed by the CIA with the help of a United
States Navy Laboratory.

Another press report indicated that

it was announced in the U.S. Senate that the CIA Director
informed a select intelligence committee that President
Reagan had approved a plan for the mining of Nicaraguan
ports. President Reagan later revealed knowledge about the
mines in another press report, although he claimed Nicaraguan
rebels had laid the mines.

Still other press reports from

top Reagan officials stated that the "mother ships" used for
the operation were operated by U.S. nationals.
Nicaragua complained about such military activities to
the United Nations Security Council.

However, through its

use of the veto, the United States was able to prevent any
action favorable to Nicaragua. 85
Then, in April 1984 Nicaragua applied to the
International Court of Justice (!CJ) for relief.

In spite of

United States arguments opposing the Court's jurisdiction,
the ICJ found it had jurisdiction to try this case.

The

Court did try the case, without U.S. participation in
pleadings or oral arguments, and decided on June 27, 1986 in
favor of Nicaraguan claims.
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The ICJ Judgment
In Nicaragua v. United States of America the ICJ
agreed that the United States had been pursuing military
policies in regard to Nicaragua.

The Court noted that it was

indeed difficult to evaluate the facts and evidence regarding
the alleged incidents.

The United States did not admit to

the military activities and, as noted, information regarding
these events was limited.
mentioned press reports
States.

The ICJ relied upon the previously
for its judgment against the United

The Court also noted that in a previously filed

Counter Memorial, the United States had referred to the fact
it had taken certain measures in self-defense.

While the

united States did not list specific facts regarding these
self-defense measures, the Court noted that the normal purpose of mentioning self-defense is to justify conduct which
would otherwise be wrongful:

•The Court thus cannot consider

reliance on self-defense to be an implicit general admission
on the part of the United States:

but it is certainly a

recognition as to the imputability of some of the activities
complained of .• 86
Specific U.S. Military Actions.

The Court was very

specific regarding the United States military involvement in
its final judgment.

For example, Paragraph 80 states:
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••• the Court finds it established that, on a
date in late 1983 or early 1984, the President
of the United States authorized a United States
government agency to lay mines in Nicaraguan
ports1 that in early 1984 mines were laid in or
close to the ports of El Bluff, Corinto and
Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal
waters or in its territorial sea or both, by
persons in the pay and acting on the instructions
of that agency, under the supervision and with the
logistic support of United States agents1 that
neither before the laying of the mines, nor subsequently, did the United States Government issue
any public and official warning to international
shipping of the existence and location of the mines1
and that personal and material injury was caused by
the ~xplosi?n o~ the ~ine~, which also crg;ted risks
causing a rise in marine insurance rates.
In addition to the laying of mines, the Court also found the
United States was implicated in other military activities,
including:
Cl>

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

(6)

10 October 1983:

an attack was made by air and

sea on the port of Corinto, involving the
destruction of five oil storage tanks, the
loss of millions of gallons of fuel, and the
evacuation of large numbers of the local
population1
14 October 1983: the underwater oil pipeline
at Puerto Sandino was again blown up:
3/4 January 1984: an attack was made by
speedboats and helcopters using rockets
against the Potosi Naval Base:
7 March 1984: an attack was made on oil and
storage facility at San Juan del Sur by
speedboats and helicopters1
28/30 March 1984: clashes occurred at Puerto
Sandino between speedboats, in the course
of minelaying operations, and Nicaraguan
patrol boats1 intervention by a helicopter in
support of the speedboats:
9 April 1984: a helicopter allegedly launched
from a mother ship in international waters
provided fire suppo9~ for an ARDE attack on
San Juan del Norte.
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After examining further Nicaraguan complaints regarding
U.S. violations of Nicaraguan airspace, and U.S. support of
the contras, the Court did find the United States had
conducted high-altitude overflights, and two lower flights
which resulted in sonic booms, with these incidents occurring
from November 7-11, 1984. 89

It was also concluded that

U.S. citizens, both military and nonmilitary provided
assistance to the contras in these incidents. 90
Specific U.S. Violations of International Law.

The

Court declared these U.S. military strategies violated international law in several respects.

Not only were specific

treaties violated, but the Court concluded that the United
States also had acted contrary to the general customs and
principles of international law.
While the Court did not find that the United States
"controlled the contras to the degree that the United States
would be legally responsible for all illegal contra acts,"
the Court did find that the U.S. support of the contras was
"a clear breach of the principle of non-intervention." 91
The Court observed that no evidence existed that the United
States was responsible for the creation of the contra force.
According to the Court:

"It seems certain that members of

the former Somoza National Guard, together with civilian
opponents to the Sandinista regime, withdrew from Nicaragua
soon after that regime was installed in Managua, and sought
to continue their struggle against it ••• " 92

Yet, the Court
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determined that over the years the U.S. support for the
contras grew:
However, it is in the Court's view established
that the support of the United States authorities
for the activities of the contras took various
forms over the years, such as logistic support,
the supply of information on the location and
movements of the Sandinista troops, the use of
sophisticated methods of communication, the
deployment of field brodcasting networks, radar
coverage, etc. The Court finds it clear that a
number of military and paramilitary operations
by this force were decided and planned, if not
actually by United States advisors, then at
least in close collaboration with them, and on
the basis of the intelligence and logistic
support which the United States was able to offer,
particularly the supply aircr~~t provided to the
contras by the United States.
Still, the Court stated there was "no clear evidence of the
United States having actually exercised such a degree of
control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as
acting on its behalf ." 94 As a result of this latter conclusion, the Court did not find the United States guilty of
humanitarian crimes committed by the contras.
However, the Court also found that the United States
had intervened in Nicaragua contrary to the principles of
international law.

The Court noted that the United States

policy toward Nicaragua "has consistently sought to achieve
changes in Nicaraguan policy and behavior." 95 Further, the
Court found that the United States was well aware of the
contras' intentions to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.
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The Court therefore found:
•.. the support given by the United States, up to
the end of Septemer 1984, to the military and
paramilitary activities of the contras in
Nicaragua, by financial support, training, supply
of weapons, intelligence and logistic support,
constitutes a cle§6 breach of the principle of
non-intervention.
Such actions were also "in breach of its obligation ••• not to
use force against another state." 97
The Court noted that the United States had attempted to
justify its support of the contra actions by claiming the
Sandinista government was repressive.

The United States

claimed tha Nicaragua had taken "significant steps towards
establishing a totalitarian Communist dictatorship;" but the
Court found that even if this were true, it would not open up
"a right of intervention by one State against another on the
ground that the latter has opted for some particular ideology
or political system." 98
Furthermore, the Court claimed the U.S. laying of the
mines also violated customary international law.

For

example, this action was an abridgement of Nicaragua's
freedom of communication and maritime commerce. 99 And, by
directing or authorizing overflights of Nicaraguan territory,
the United States was found to have acted •in breach of its
obligation under customary international law not to violate
the sovereignty of another state."100
While the Court did not find the United States guilty
of violating international humanitarian law, it did note that
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the United States had acted contrary to the principles of
humanitarian law by producing and distributing a 1983 manual
entitled:

"Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare.•

The Court did not find evidence specifically linking the
United States to humanitarian crimes, and it was noted that
the CIA later attempted to modify the effect of this
pamphlet.

Yet, the Court felt the document must still have

served as an "encouragement• to those who would "commit acts
contrary to general principles of international humanitarian
law reflected in treaties."lOl
The Court noted even more U.S. violations.

The laying

of mines, and interference with the freedom of the seas was a
breach of customary international law.

The Court also stated

the United States had violated provisions of the United
Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, and the United States had
acted against its promised obligations in its Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation which both the United
States and Nicaragua had signed in 1956.
The Court's Directions to the United States.

The

Court clearly stated United States military policies were not
acceptable.

As a result of U.S. violations of international

law, the Court decided that:
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(1)

(2)

•.• the United States of America is under
a duty immediately to cease and to ref rain
from all such acts as may constitute breaches
of the foregoing legal obligations;
•.• the United States of America is under an
obligation to make reparation to the Republic
of Nicaragua for all injury caused to
Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations •••
.•• the form and amount of such reparation
failing agreement between the Pf5~ies,
will be settled by the Court ••.

The Court also reminded both Nicaragua and the United States
of their obligation "to seek a solution to their disputes by
peaceful means in accordance with international law." 103
Evaluation of U.S. Actions
In its involvement with the mining of the Nicaraguan
Harbor, the United States relied upon military policies
rather than pursuing alternative strategies, such as settling
problems through international legal channels.

This U.S. em-

phasis upon military options has had a negative impact upon
the international environment, even encouraging anarchical
tendencies within the inter- national system.

Further, a

negative image which already was held by many countries toward the United States was reinforced by these actions.
Failure to Use the ICJ as an Alternative to Military
Strategies.

The United States argued that the ICJ had no

jurisdiction regarding the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, that
this was a political incident.

And, soon after the American

refusal to participate in the case, October 7, 1985--the
U.S. Secretary of State, George Schultz, deposited the
withdrawal from Article 36 (2) of the Statute of the
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International court of Justice (the Optional Clause,
voluntarily signed by the United States, granting the Court
compulsory jurisdiction).
Politics v. Justice.

In rejecting the compulsory

jurisdiction by the Court, the United States State Department
insisted:
The conflict in Central America, therefore, is not
a narrow legal dispute; it is an inherently poltical
problem that is not appropriate for judicial resolution. The conflict will be solved by political and
diplomatic means--not through a judicial tribunal. 104
However, as previously noted the United States has seemingly
used diplomatic encounters with Nicaragua as opportunities to
make further demands upon that country rather than truly
attempting to seek an accomodation.

And, in the very

political setting of the U.N. Security Council, the United
States used its veto power to block Nicaraguan initiatives.
Yet, the United States claimed that the Court would not
represent a fair, impartial standard of truth.

Instead, the

United States claimed that the ICJ had become politicized.
It may be that the United Nations as an organization has
become involved in international politics.

Many analysts

have regarded diplomatic statements as well as U.N. resolutions as biased:

•we have seen in the United Nations, in the

last decade or more, how international organizations have
become more politicized against the interests of Western
democracies.• 105 And, the fear has existed that the Court
might become as politicized as the other U.N. agencies.
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Noting the U.S. fear of anti-Western sentiment American
jurists have questioned:

" ••• why should a superpower, in

matters of essential national interest, ever subordinate its
power of initiation to a system that it does not control and
that may even be controlled by our enemies?" 106 It also
seemed unfair for the Untied States to abide by such a
possible politicized decision, when other nations of the
world had been less accepting of the court's authority.

For

example, out of 159 member U.N. states, the United States was
"one of only 44 states to have accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction." 107 And regarding the sixteen judges
who were to try the case, Nicaragua v. United States of
America, "11 judges were from countries that do not accept
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction." 108
The reality is that politics permeate the international
environment, affecting even legal processes.

Therefore, it

would be an error to view politics and international law as
separate. 109 Rather, the legal process is often utilized
in a political manner:

"The controverted versions of inter-

national law are parts of the weaponry of political warfare
to support adversary claims, not ideas engaged in a contest
for truth."llO

And, "states generally conceive their

disputes in fundamentally political terms." 111
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Accordingly, it has been argued:
Legal dimensions of international disputes are
seen as an extension of the political character
of these disputes. As political actors, states
are understandably reticent about losing control
of the disputes to which they are a party, and
this means, in part, that states tend to adhere
to their own conceptualization of disputes rather
than accept a conce~t~alization presented from an
alternative source.
There have been occasions when the politics asociated
with the Court have been helpful in creating an atmosphere
which fosters the eventual resolution of the international
problem.

For example, the court can serve political inter-

ests by slowing down hostilities, and giving opponents a
chance to resolve their differences politically.

Continued

participation by the United States in the ICJ case:
" •.• would at least have afforded time for a political settlement of the controversy." 113 The Court also can provide an
opportunity for countries to publicize their views.

Further,

the threat of taking a state before the ICJ can also be used
as a bargaining maneuver to pressure the other country to
compromise.

In this sense, "the mere presence of the Court

provides one possible means of settling disputes in a
peaceful fashion." 114
There have even been occasions when the United States
has benef itted from the relationship between law and
politics.

For example, the United States has manipulated

legal arguments to serve its own political interests.

During

the Cuban Missile Crisis the United States desired to prevent
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Soviet military supplies from reaching Cuba--but did not want
to violate the freedom of the seas, causing an act of war.
Analysts, writing about U.S. legal arguments concerning the
establishment of a naval quarantine have written:

"surely

the American concern for international law was not a
significant factor" in establishing a naval quarantine of
Cuba; rather, "ambiguity in the law simply left room" for the
United States to pursue this legal strategy. 115 And, during the hostage crisis in 1980, the United States benefitted
from the diplomatic climate--partly influenced by the ICJ--in
which Iran felt compelled to release the American hostages .116

The Court, "acting in a highly politicized

environment," was able to influence events in a situation
where the employment and threats of U.S. power had "failed
utterly" to achieve results. 117
Therefore, it is a misconception to distinguish between
law and politics in a dichotomous fashion.

Rather, it is

necessary to understand the relationship betwen law and
politics:
••• law and lawfulness do not replace politics;
they redirect politics by establishing an orderliness to dispute resolution and a content to the
dialogue of the dispute. It makes sense to think
of the development of lawfulness as a movement
along a continuum ranging from power-centered to
principle-centered approaches to dispute resolution.
Given the current state of international law, it is
easy to see that the states of the w~f ad still have
some way to go along this continuum.
In light of the preceding arguments, it would not seem
to have been in the best interests of the United States to
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withdraw from the ICJ case involving Nicaragua.

To many

nations the U.S. response seemed extreme and reactive.

The

United States should have remembered that the ICJ had been
useful to the United States in the past: " ••• we should not
have walked away .•• " 119
Power v. Legality.

By refusing the participate in a

legal process and by withdrawing from the Optional Clause, it
seemed as if the United States felt more secure relying on
military policies to achieve its aims, rather than trusting
in the adjudicative process.

The United States actions

seemed to indicate "that the U.S. interest is better
protected when the nation relies on its own power than when
it is submerged in a multilateral system which it cannot
control." 120 Soon after the United States withdrew from
the Court case, President Reagan clearly indicated he would
continue to rely upon military policies.

In a news

conference on February 22, 1985 he stated that until the
Sandinista government says "uncle,n the goal of U.S. policy
"is directly that of removing the 'present structure' of that
government." 121 This no doubt seemed a credible threat of
force since the United States invaded Grenada soon after
President Reagan had once described that government as
consisting of "leftist thugs." 122
International legal agreements also do not seem to
have restrained the United States from its military policies
in Nicaragua.

As noted, the ICJ found the United States had
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violated provisions of the United Nations Charter, the OAS
Charter, and its Friendship Treaty with Nicaragua.
International jurists had hoped the development of supranational institutions and their accompanying international
law would restrain the conduct of states in the world, but
U.S. actions seem to indicate that "the Organizaton of
American States is of only marginal importance if it interferes with the U.S. policy of keeping Communist elites from
gaining control of governments in the hemisphere." 123
(U.S. lack of support for any Contadora proposal that would
accord legitimacy to leftist governments would seem further
substantiation of this argument).
Although there are some moralists who would always
eschew the use of force, other analysts would insist that
"the structure and stability of a community depend upon
both law and power." 124 For example, the system of law
can be regarded--not as a substitute for force--but as a
"summary of the rules through which the society of nations
deems it proper that the sanction of force be used to uphold
the law." 125 Some analysts even argue that coercion is
legitimate:
The nub of the matter is that the word 'coercion'
has no normative significance; there is nothing
illegal about coercion ••• Coercion is moral in
all human relationships ••• so is cooperation.
Indeed, every human relationship is some mixture
of coercion and cooperation. So to say that a
particular relationship is coercive f~ to say
nothing at all about its legitimacy. 6
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Increase in System Instability.

The problem with

states resorting to military strategies is that this adds to
the uncertainty in the international system.

If inter-

national law seems to allow a certain amount of force to be
used (as in

self-help, self-defense, retaliation>, most

states have still faced a basic problem regarding the amount
of force needed to achieve state aims.

And, "power-seeking

alone" may not be "entirely productive of system
stability." 127
An example of system instability is the area of
customary law.

It can be argued that recent U.S. military

strategies are affecting international law in a confusing
manner.

The continued U.S. reliance upon military force may

affect customary law by setting new standards for one state's
intervention into the affairs of another state. 128 For
example, the U.S. intervention in Grenada which ended the
government that had just seized power through force, and the
present support for the contras to remove the Sandinista
regime in Nicaragua may be influencing a new rule of customary international laws and this new standard seemingly would
allow states to intervene in other states possessing
"improper" governments. 129
In fact, since the end of World War II there has been
an increase in state intervention.

There has seemed to be a
"new international concern regarding human rights." 130
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Since World War II there has been a revolution
in international legal affairs that permits states
to intervene on behalf of insurgents within other
states who are fighting against obvious regime
terror. This revolution has removed a state's
sovereignty regarding its own nationals from the
claim of domestic jurisdiction whenever such
trea~ment fail~ to conform to particular normative
requirements. 1
Even though •human rights" and •democratic arguments"
are used by the United States to justify its activities in
Nicaragua, Nicaragua can turn the same argument around to
justify its support for insurgents in El Salvador.

There-

fore, Nicaraguan intervention in El Salvador •may not be an
instance of aggression at all.•

Rather, following the same

emphasis on human rights emphasized by Carter, Nicaraguan
officials can argue their •actions toward El Salvador may
qualify as 'humanitarian intervention.•• 132 In new
customary law, then, it could be argued that: "Intervention
can be both permissible and required.• 133 Seen from this
perspective, recent U.S. military policies may not only be
influencing events in the Caribbean, they may be influencing
the direction of international relations.

And, the new

direction of international behavior may be less ordered by
restraint.

Analysts have warned:

•ay acting on the time-

dishonoured assumptions of political 'realism' the United
States will enlarge the arena of worldwide instability.• 134
Another example of system instability regards "spheres
of influence.•

While rules of international behavior could

not be considerd standardized, there are analysts who have
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claimed that several years ago there seemed to be tacitly
understood rules regarding superpowers and their regional
conflicts.

This understanding regarded spheres of influence,

with the idea that each superpower could intervene in its own
sphere of influence, but it would refrain from intervening in
the other's area of dominance.

However, this tacit under-

standing no longer holds true.

In the present day, the

interests of each power are now worldwide, as reflected by
U.S. suport for Afghan rebels, and U.S.S.R. assistance to
Nicaragua.

At present, therefore:

There is little consensus between the superpowers on the principles that should be applied
in negotiations on regional conflicts, and little
consistency in the approach that each has taken
in addressing the varous confl~5t situations in
which it has become involved.
Following international law and pursuing other
order-seeking strategies could "do much to counteract the
uncertainty" associated "with power-seeking strategies." 136
Specifically, the rules of international justice provide a
general outline for promoting order-seeking strategies;
therefore:
••• it seems reasonable to place great weight
on their importance in the course of a state's
foreign policy-making. A state which fails to
respect these international norms will incur
difficulties in managing international uncertainty in the best interest of its citizenry. 137
It would be in the best interest of the United States,
then, to respect international customs and laws in order to
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help reduce international tension.

These rules of inter-

national justice provide a general outline for promoting
order-seeking strategies; in fact, these strategies are
essential for the effective management of international
uncertainty. 138 Thucydides noted that •the strong do what
they have power to do and the weak accept what they have to
accept.• 139 However, such behaviors only increase international uncertainty, with the risk of military strategies
escalating.

Observing this, Richard Falk has written:

"The

world may not have much time left in which to establish an
effective system of world law.• 140
In spite of the inherent destruction associated with
military confrontations in the international environment, it
should be emphasized that the development of international
order is an evolutionary process, one that will take time.
Most analysts agree that the International Court of Justice
is still "far from attaining a centralized judicial
authority.• 141 In fact, the international community can
still be regarded at an early state of evolution. 142 In
this regard, for international law to be effective there
needs to be a general acceptance that •international law--and
the ICJ in particular--are important contributors" to
international stability; this acceptance is •fundamental to
the evolution of an international legal system." 143

If

states are to interact on the basis of lawfulness, the
disputants will need to conceptualize their differences
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within a framework, or at least be willing •to fit the
dispute under the control of legal rnachinery.• 144 Indeed:
It is essential that the United States government discover the practical value of legal selfrestraint and that we f ijislawful ways to promote
our political interests.
The mere existence of law cannot itself create order in
international relations, but predictability in international
relations will increase if minimum degrees of law are
observed--and international law may rationalize and extend
whatever order exists. 146 There is a need to develop
policies respecting international law--for the sake of
managing international security, and ultimately for survival.
•until we build a real international community, other forms
of coercion will remain as instruments for the games nations
play.•147
The United States as a Villain.

U.S. actions in

Nicaragua have weakened the prestige of the United States
itself, as well as weakening inernational law.

As some

analysts have argued, the U.S. withdrawal from the Optional
Clause made the United States seem guilty of the Nicaraguan
charges.

It has been argued that the U.S. withdrawal from

the Court is proof that the Reagan Administration had no real
facts to support its assertion of Nicaraguan involvement in
El Salvador, and no justificaion for U.S. military pol148
. .
. d States b e portraye d as
ic1es.
Not on 1 y can t h e Unite
guilty in the short run, but it has also been argued that

~
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"in the long run, it deprives the United States of whatever
moral superiority accrues from a continuous commitment to
restraint and law." 149

For example, the United States had

historically been committed to the idea of a higher law as
codified in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution1 but as a result of recent U.S. military policies the
United States has even been characterized by one analyst as
"becoming an outlaw in international politics."lSO
According to this point of view, the United States only is
concerned about international law when it is convenient for
its own political purposes.

For example, the United States

has deplored the former government of Grenada and the
Sandinista government, yet the United States tolerates human
rights abuses in governments it favors, such as in Guatemala,
Paraguay, or Chile.

Rather than observing international

legal norms, the United States can be viewed as following
power-seeking motives in regard to Nicaragua:

"United States

'covert' tactics are purely counter-revolutionary operations
that deliberately subordinate humanitarian concerns to the
presumed interests of geopolitics.• 151

Even members of the

OAS have expressed concern about U.S. actions.

In a November

1986 meeting, the Peruvian delegate asked the OAS how it was

possible that the United States "an OAS member state can
legally approve financing, training, and arming an irregular
army to attack another country that is also a member of the
same organization." 152
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OVERALL EVALUATION OF U.S. STRATEGIES
IN NICARAGUA
The historical overview of U.S. actions in Nicaragua
points out the heavy reliance of the United States upon
military strategies to manage political or economic uncertainty.

These policies have not eradicated the sources of

instability, and U.S. actions--as in support of Somoza-- have
tended to support the status quo, preventing meaningful
reforms in Nicaragua.

Thus, in the long run, the problems

causing instability have continued to fester.
In spite of American policies a Marxist/socialist
government has developed which the United States has regarded
with disfavor.

Aside from deploring a lack of true democracy

and human rights, the United States has regarded the
Sandinistas as a destabilizing factor in the Caribbean Basin
area.

The Reagan Administration particularly tended to view

developments in Nicaragua from a

Cold War perspective,

seeing the Sandinistas as a front for communist agitation
within the region.

The Reagan Administration's current

approach to Nicaragua continues to rely upon military
strategies--rather than exploring alternative approaches to
resolution--such as through the Contadora process or through
ICJ resolution.
Through its military strategies the United States has
attempted to alter Nicaragua's state behavior.

A variety of

military strategies have been pursued in Nicaragua.

For
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example, shows of force have been conducted over recent
years.

Large naval displays have been regarded as "gunboat

diplomacy" by some analysts because the scope and size of
recent maneuvers, such as Big Pine II, would suggest that
they were meant to have a coercive threat.

Threatening

actions were backed by threatening statements from Reagan,
Haig, Kirkpatrick and other top administration officials.
The location of naval task forces off both coasts of
Nicaragua and of U.S. troops near the Nicaraguan border could
also be construed as actions designed to make the verbal
threats more credible.
this.

U.S. actions have seemed to promise

Over time, U.S. sponsored military activities have

escalated.

In fact, there were so many military personnel

involved in the Big Pine II exercises that this has been
regarded by some as no less than a temporary stationing of
U.S. troops in the area.

Just as there came to be military

advisors and citizens involved in this area, there was also
an increase in the amount of U.S. finances spent on these
activities.

When congressional policies were designed to

restrain U.S. military strategies, secret arms deals, secret
Swiss accounts, and private donations by private citizens and
other foreign leaders temporarily financed the U.S. supported
contra effort.

United States strategies also seemed to have

been used as a threat based upon the assumption that the expectation of continued violence would "get the wanted be.
.153
h avior.

H

.
.
owever, mi. 1 itary
strategies
have also been
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used as a bargaining tool.

The United States has suggested

that its support of the contras is designed to foster change
in the Nicaraguan government; presumbly enough suitable
changes by Nicaragua would affect U.S. actions, alleviating
the necessity of U.S. support for the contras and their
U.S. training camps.
And, if the Nicaraguans didn't change their political
positions, it was hoped that the U.S. military policies would
lead to the fall of the Nicaraguan government.

In 1983 the

CIA Director Casey predicted in congressional testimony that
the contras stood a good chance of def eating the Sandinistas
by the end of the year. 154 Other Administration officials
hoped continued covert activities would pressure the
Sandinistas to infringe on civil liberties; at the least this
would diminish the appeal of Nicaragua as a model for other
countries to follow. 155 Still other officials hoped:
.•• that a threatened Sandinista government will
bring itself down by further repressing its internal
opposition, thereby strengthening the determination
of moderate forces to resist. If 1 ~gat happens •••
then the Sandinistas will fall...
.
To this date, U.S. military policies have not seemed
very effective in achieving U.S. objectives.

Nicaragua has

admitted having social, economic, and political problems--but
has seemed determined not to succumb to U.S. pressures.
Contra activities not only have been of doubtful value, but
U.S. support of the contras has been increasingly criticized,
both at home and abroad.
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U.S. policies in Nicaragua need to be recalculated and
alternatives to military strategies need to be explored.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
GENERALIZATIONS
Although states have pursued order-seeking strategies
at times, they have often seemed to follow advice given to
the prince by Machiavelli--that force is often necessary to
achieve state goals.

While moralists and realists have

debated over the appropriateness of force, states nevertheless have continued to employ or threaten military
actions.

These policies appear to have been based upon the

assumption that the threat or even the use of limited
violence is useful in projecting state power to alter the
behavior of other states. 1 Further, these military
strategies have been considered more effective methods to
communicate the resolve of a state than merely verbalizing
state intentions. 2 In fact, many analysts have viewed
military strategies as part of a communication process--as an
influence, bargaining, or coercive attempt to alter the
behavior of other states. 3
The use of U.S. military strategies as a means to
alter state behavior has been evident in the Caribbean Basin,
with the United States pursuing a variety of military
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policies.

Some policies have attempted to alter the behavior

of other states, but to do so without engaging in physical

violence.

These policies include conducting naval maneuvers,

as a "show-of-force" to a nearby state which the United
States wished to influence, as when the Marblehead was sent
to the coast of El Salvador to influence a ceasefire agreeOOnt.

In some instances, U.S. policies have not actually

involved using force against another state; but the threat of
using such force has made the military policies seem
coercive.

For example, official statements by U.S. policy-

makers and large naval maneuvers such as the Big Pine II
exercises seem to have been intended to threaten Nicaragua to
alter its state behavior.

In other instances the United

States apparently has assumed that limited violence is useful
to project state power.

For example, U.S. troops intervened

in Haiti in 1915 to secure strategic and economic control of
the area; U.S. troops intervened in the Dominican Republic
from 1916-1924, establishing martial law and a U.S. military
government; and in 1917 U.S. marines intervened in Cuba,
putting down strikes and protecting U.S. property.

Another

strategic policy of the United States has been categorized as
"coercive diplomacy."

United States strategy during the

Cuban Missile Crisis, has been characterized as "coercive
diplomacy."

In spite of the high level of risk during this

crisis U.S. policy has been conceptualized as "a persuasion
attempt rather than pure coercion." 4 However, the Bay of
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Pigs invasion has been regarded as definitely coercive--a
more "crude use of force." 5 These policies of using force
suggest that the United States has viewed limited violence as
useful to influence, threaten, coerce, or bargain with a
country in order to alter that state's behavior.
INFERENCES
First Impressions
In the short term it might seem that the U.S. military
policies in the Caribbean Basin have been successful.

Such

policies have been used to influence, threaten, coerce, or
bargain with a country to alter its state behavior.
There are many examples to illustrate this point.

For

instance military strategies have enabled the United States
to protect American economic interests; and the United States
has remained the hegemonic power in the area.

The United

States has sponsored groups who successfully overthrew the
Arbenz government in Guatemala; prevented a communist government from coming to power in the Dominican Republic; and
halted the increased influence of the Soviets during the
Cuban Missile Crisis.

More recently, United States military

action prevented a communist government from solidifying its
political power in Grenada.

Military strategies are cur-

renty being pursued with regard to Nicaragua; and there is
some evidence to indicate that Nicaragua did respond to U.S.
military policies by becoming more accepting of the Contadora
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negotiation process.

It plausibly could be argued that

restrained Cuban and Soviet support for Nicaragua is
partially due to hesitation created by U.S. military
strategies.
Further Analysis
A more in-depth analysis suggests that first
impressions regarding the U.S. use of force are not entirely
accurate.

Although many military strategies have seemed

useful at the moment, these same policies have presented
problems over a longer period of time.
United States military intervention has particularly
been resented.

As previously noted, in 1915 the United

States marines imposed martial law in Haiti to ensure a
stable environment; yet a growing nationalist movement
opposed this action, leading to a tense political situation
and to a demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops--which was
agreed to in 1934.

In Panama, the United States was influ-

ential in establishing an increased military presence in the
area during World War II, but U.S. actions produced
"anti-Yankee nationalism."

Other resentments from varied

U.S. invasions have continued to affect u.s.-caribbean
relations.
There also has been a concern regarding whether a
military strategy was the only policy that could have been
employed.

For example, Senator Fulbright opposed U.S. ac-

tions in Guatemala.

He argued that such a military policy
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did not represent the best foreign policy and that
U.S. reliance upon military strategies prevented other

political options from being chosen.

This same argument has

been applied to U.S. actions in Grenada and Nicaragua.

And,

analysts who have reviewed the Bay of Pigs invasion have felt
that political options were not fully explored because
policymakers relied upon a previous Guatemalan covert

plan

which seemed applicable to the Cuban invasion.
It has also been suggested that the United States is
employing military strategies to the degree that order in the
international community is threatened by U.S. actions.
fact, the United States

In

has come to be regarded by some

critics as a state that only follows international law when
it seems convenient for it to do so.

For example, U.S. ac-

tions in the Dominican Republic were ratified after the fact
by the O.A.S.

Or, in the case of the Grenada invasion, the

United States responded to a request from several Eastern
Caribbean states, but not from a majority of states as required by the treaty.

Such actions have been regarded

unfavorably by the international community as demonstrated by
various U.N. resolutions, speeches, and even by security
council votes and debates.

Allies, even in the O.A.S., crit-

icized the United States for its actions in Grenada.

The ICJ

also stated that certain U.S. actions in connection with the
mining of the Nicaraguan harbor were in opposition to international law.

It has been argued that the United States
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further indicated its disregard for international law by
refusing to allow the matter to be resolved through international legal dispute processes--claiming instead that the
issue was a political matter.
Just as the United States has seemed to disregard
international law, it has also seemed to bypass international
organizations or regional groups which could help in dispute
resolution.

It has seemed--especially in the Nicaraguan

case--that the United States has preferred to rely upon
military strategies rather than to trust in a resolution
process that it could not control.

The United States has not

appeared tolerant of accepting political or economic diversity within the region.

For example, a previous intimation

by Mexico--that it might be possible for a socialist country
to peacefully exist with its neighbors as long as it made no
attempt to export its revolutionary ideas--has reinforced the
suspicion of the United States toward regional solutions.
ASSUMPTIONS CHALLENGED
Assumption #1
The assumption that forceful policies are
pragmatic strategies needs to be challenged.

useful

As noted, pol-

icies which seemed successful in the short term often caused
problems in the future.

It has been pointed out that these

U.S. policies have caused criticism for the United States.
It is difficult to accept that unpopular policies are
successful.
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U.S. actions often have disturbances within the
international community.
fact.

This is a particularly alarming

It was noted earlier that the international environ-

ment has been characterized as being anarchic, with risktaking having been a common pattern of international relations.

In fact, analysts have argued that a state might

weigh power-seeking or order-seeking strategies to calculate
which strategy would pay the greatest dividends in any particular instance 6 Yet, these same analysts have pointed out
that power-seeking by one state may increase power-seeking
strategies in other states. 7 If, as also argued by these
analysts, the state has a "moral responsibility" to manage
international uncertainty in the best interests of its
citizens, then it would seem the U.S. reliance upon military
strategies needs to be reevaluated.
It does seem that U.S. actions have created more
uncertainty within the international community.

It has been

noted that previously accepted patterns of interaction have
become less clear due to U.S. military strategies.

For

example, recent U.S. support of the contras has suggested
that other states could claim they were intervening to change
a repressive government.

"Backyards" or spheres of influence

seem to be less clearly deliniated--with the U.S. aiding
Afghanistan

rebels~

the

u.s.s.R.

aiding the Sandinistas.

Therefore, it is not clear that military strategies are
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useful over a long period of time if they significantly
increase the international uncertainty in the world.
Assumption #2
The assumption that forceful military strategies can
be designed in a calculated, carefully designed manner to
influence, bargain or coerce also needs to be reconsidered.
As evidenced by the historical case studies, neither the
success nor the possible failures of policies can be absolutely forseen.

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the

potential for serious escalation certainly existed as the
Soviet ships approached the u.s.-established naval quarantine
line.

The Bay of Pigs invasion also involved the potential

for increasing international uncertainty.

After the un-

successful invasion attempt, the possibility for escalation
existed.

For example, United States policymakers could have

pursued guerilla warfare in Cuba.

Currently, the U.S. sup-

port of the contras risks widening the conflict in the
Caribbean area.
The various case studies have suggested that there is
no guarantee a military policy will have a particular effect.
As Bernholz has pointed out:

the international system is
not perfectly predictable or fully controllable. 8 Therefore, military strategies represent serious risks and in-

crease international uncertainty.

As Etheredge has argued:
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" ••• analytical brilliance and technical rationality are
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for peace." 9
Furthermore, present American foreign policies ignore
changes in the international system which have markedly
diminished the ability of the United States to control
events:
Power to control, or even to dictate,
internal political processes within Latin
American nations has been weakened irreversibly by the natural historical processes of
growth, the integration of nation-states on
the continent, and the release of pent-up
political, social and economic aspiprations
of the vast majority of the populations in
many of these countries. The time has long
passed when the United States could cavalierly
send tr£8PS to install regimes of its own
liking.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States foreign policy needs to stress the
development of policies rather than heavily relying upon
military actions.

Since it would seem that U.S. strategies

often have been dysfunctional rather than utilitarian, the
United States needs to recalculate its policies, devising
state behaviors that will not only obtain short-term goals
but which will be effective over a longer period of time.
Analysts have suggested a wide variety of alternatives
to current American policies.

It has been suggested that

observing international law and pursuing other order-seeking
behaviors could "do much to counteract the uncertainty"
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associated with power-seeking. 11

Other analysts have

stressed the poverty and instability of the Caribbean area;

and have suggested that U.S. supported reform efforts could
create a more economically well balanced--possibly a more
democratic--environment
the area.

which could create more stability in

Still others have suggested that the United States

needs to re-evaluate its stated reasons for intervention.
Perhaps the verbalized assumption that communism is dangerous
to U.S. security needs to be re-calculated; perhaps the
United States needs to be more accepting of socialist regimes
in the Caribbean as long as they do not try to foment
revolution in other areas.
Regardless of the specific policies devised, it is
clear that to manage international uncertainty in the best
interests of its citizens, the United States needs to pursue
alternative strategies.
is clear:

The warning suggested by this study

"Long term success in the application of military

strategies is not easily achieved; disaster is always a
single bad decision away.• 12
Further, as has been pointed out, a substantial degree
of general consent is needed in the international system.
"The exercise of power alone cannot lead to a stable
international order." 13
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